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ABSTRACT 
 
According to the Chayeses in their book The New Sovereignty, 
management processes can be effective in inducing state compli-
ance of international norms by promoting interaction between 
states and other stakeholders, increasing transparency, and assist-
ing states in building their own capacity for enforcement.  Yet, 
there has been a lack of empirical research on the effectiveness of 
these management processes in terms of their domestic impact.  
Therefore, this article attempts to measure the effectiveness of 
management processes by conducting an empirical assessment of 
the monitoring process under the OECD Anti-Bribery Conven-
tion—which has been acclaimed to be the gold standard of moni-
toring by Transparency International—to determine the extent and 
ways in which management processes can influence states’ domes-
tic laws and policies.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  
International legal scholars have long sought ways to induce 
treaty compliance among states.  The main challenge lies in that 
states are often reluctant to negotiate treaties that build in strong 
sanctions; at the same time, there is the need for sufficient teeth to 
drive states to comply with international norms.  As a way to coun-
terbalance these interests, the Chayeses introduced in their book 
The New Sovereignty that management can be an effective way to 
induce state compliance not by placing sanctions on governments, 
but rather, by guiding states through a continuous interactive pro-
cess that involves justification, discourse and persuasion.1  In other 
words, management takes a cooperative, problem-solving ap-
proach rather than relying on coercive mechanisms for enforce-
ment.2  It aims to help states comply with international norms by 
increasing transparency in the system and enhancing state capacity 
through continuous strategic interaction for the exchange of infor-
mation and expertise among various multiple stakeholders includ-
ing nonstate actors.  According to the Chayeses, states are induced 
to comply under this process because states have a propensity to 
comply through participation within international regimes that are 
based on a “tightly woven fabric of international agreements, or-
ganizations and institutions that shape relations with one anoth-
er.”3  The Chayeses describe this web of international ties as a new 
form of sovereignty in which a state can no longer act as an inde-
                                               
1  See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY 25-28 (1998) (explaining that a horizontal process of management 
can induce compliance); see also Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Com-
pliance Without Enforcement: State Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties, 7 NEGOTIATION 
J. 311 (1991) (reviewing the enforcement mechanisms that parties to a treaty com-
monly select); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, From Law Enforcement to 
Dispute Settlement: A New Approach to Arms Control Verification and Compliance, 4 
INT’L SEC. 147 (1990) (analyzing the importance of political verifications within 
compliance monitoring apparatuses); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, 
Living Under a Treaty Regime: Compliance, Interpretation, and Adaptation, in 
DEFENDING DETERRENCE: MANAGING THE ABM TREATY REGIME INTO THE 21ST 
CENTURY 197 (Antonia Handler Chayes & Paul Doty eds., 1989) (identifying that 
the conclusion of an arms control agreement is not the end of the story and re-
quires active compliance monitoring).  
2  CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 1, at 25-28.  
3  CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 1, at 26; see also Wolf-
gang H. Reinecke, Global Public Policy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 127, 127-38 (1997) (explain-
ing that globalization, unlike interdependence, penetrates the deep structure and 
strategic behavior of corporations and other actors in the international system). 
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pendent unit, but must cooperate with other states in order to 
achieve its own objectives.  States, in general, have been favorable 
to this management approach as it has been widely adopted in var-
ious international regimes, including the environment, the nuclear-
test-ban treaty, and in the anti-corruption regimes.  Despite its 
broad usage, however, there has been a lack of empirical research 
on whether these processes have in fact been effective in inducing 
states to comply with international norms.  Some scholars have as-
sessed compliance efforts in the environmental regime and the 
general impact of the anti-corruption regime on states, but there 
has not been an empirical assessment on the extent and ways in 
which such management tools have been able to influence member 
states’ domestic laws and policies for compliance.4 
Against this backdrop, this article attempts to measure the ef-
fectiveness of the management process based on a quantitative and 
qualitative assessment.  It will specifically focus on the 1999 Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) 
Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions5 since it has developed one of 
the most sophisticated tools of management, identified as the gold 
standard of monitoring by nongovernmental organizations such as 
Transparency International.6  Forty-three member states, including 
OECD and non-OECD countries, are taking part in a rigorous peer-
                                               
4  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International 
Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141 (2002) (explaining 
how values and interests have led to the global anti-corruption movement); Ra-
chel Brewster, The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 84 (2014) (examining a member state’s efforts to en-
force its own national legislation and prohibit foreign corruption within its territo-
ry with regard to its nationals doing business abroad); see also CECILY ROSE, 
INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION NORMS: THEIR CREATION AND INFLUENCE ON 
DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS (2015) (tracing the creation of international anti-
corruption norms by state actors). 
5  The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was adopted under the initiative of 
the U.S. to combat foreign bribery.  See generally OECD, Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 
1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 [hereinafter Convention], 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SMU3-H3NL]. 
 6  To access OECD’s database for monitoring countries’ implementation and 
enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention, see Country Monitoring of the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-
briberyconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/7TX9-FGQW] (last visited Jan. 19, 
2018). 
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review monitoring system that is carried out under the OECD 
Working Group on Foreign Bribery.  The management process is 
implemented through various phases to determine whether legisla-
tion and enforcement capacities of states are in compliance with 
the Convention for effective prevention of corruption and foreign 
bribery.  Based on reports submitted by governments and on-site 
visits with relevant actors, including business representatives and 
civil society groups, the Working Group provides specific recom-
mendations to each individual state that are continuously fol-
lowed-up on in the peer review process and published on its web-
site.  All of this data from 2000 until 2015 was analyzed to assess 
the general performance of states by numerically coding the im-
plementation status of the specific recommendations for each state.  
The quantitative assessment is further supported by a qualitative 
assessment of two countries, the United Kingdom and the Republic 
of Korea, to determine how management tools have influenced 
these specific states and to examine the factors which have enabled 
such change.  The United Kingdom adopted the Bribery Act in 
2010 while the Republic of Korea began to sanction companies for 
foreign bribery, providing a useful assessment in examining the 
role of the OECD Working Group in the monitoring process.  Qual-
itative evidence is based on official reports from international or-
ganizations, governments, and interviews of independent experts 
and practitioners in the field.  The hypothesis of this assessment is 
that management can influence states to take greater domestic le-
gal action against businesses for foreign bribery.  
Ultimately, by providing insight into the effectiveness of these 
management tools, this assessment can not only contribute to the 
enhancement of the management process under the anti-
corruption regime, but it can also provide important lessons for 
management in other international regimes, particularly for regu-
lating transnational business activity.  For example, in the area of 
business and human rights, there are discussions for the adoption 
of a new treaty on business and human rights and some of the 
management tools used in the foreign bribery regime could be uti-
lized in the business and human rights context.7  More specifically, 
                                               
7  For discussions on the adoption of a new treaty on business and human 
rights, see Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, at ¶ 1 
(July 14, 2014) (directing the U.N. “to establish an open-ended intergovernmental 
working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with 
respect to human rights; whose mandate shall be to elaborate an international le-
gally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activi-
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foreign bribery management tools can provide valuable insight for 
enhancing detection, investigation and enforcement of company 
due diligence measures.  Similar lessons could be provided in the 
area of the environment, particularly with the recent adoption of 
the Paris Agreement.  As such, the last part will conclude with an 
analysis of conditions in which management processes can work 
most effectively as way to enhance compliance among states.  
 
1.1.  Chayeses’ Managerial Theory 
 
The Chayeses’ managerial theory is based on a new concept of 
sovereignty: sovereignty is no longer a state’s capacity to act as an 
independent unit or a governmental autonomy, but rather where 
the state is connected to the rest of the world, maintaining its status 
or membership within the international system.8  This status or 
membership of a state is based on the consent of the state to partic-
ipate in international regimes, providing room for institutions to 
intervene in states’ domestic affairs.9  As states submit to these in-
ternational regimes, the Chayeses argue that states have a propen-
sity to comply due to efficiency, national interest and regime 
norms.10  The management approach enhances efficiency because 
compliance with international norms provides a standard operat-
ing procedure for states and reduces transactional costs because 
there is no need to recalculate the costs and benefits of a decision.11  
Moreover, compliance can serve the interests of participating states 
                                                                                                          
ties of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”). 
 8  CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 1, at 26-27 (explaining 
that “Sovereignty, in the end, is status—the vindication of the state’s existence as a 
member of the international system.”).  
 9  Id. at 230 (“[I]n the last analysis, the ability of a state to remain a participant 
in the international policy-making process — and thus its status as a member of 
the international legal system – depends in some degree on its demonstrated will-
ingness to accept and engage the regime’s compliance procedures.”).  See also 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2004) (referring to the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty’s report on the Responsibility to Protect, which de-
scribes this newly defined sovereignty in which a state accepts the authority of 
institutions to intervene in its own domestic affairs if it fails to protect its own 
people). 
 10  CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 1, at 3-9.  
 11  Id. at 4.  
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because treaties are consent-based instruments.12  Lastly, the au-
thors argue that regime norms induce state compliance because ini-
tial compliance is motivated by a normative consensus on an issue 
area.13 
Yet, the Chayeses explain that there are circumstances when 
states do not comply due to ambiguity of treaty language, limita-
tions on the capacity of parties to implement the treaty, or time lag 
between a state’s undertaking and its performance.14  As a way to 
address these sources of non-compliance, the Chayeses argue that 
the interactive process of justification, discourse, and persuasion 
can induce states to eventually submit to the pressures of interna-
tional regulations.15  The Chayeses, in particular, emphasize that 
institutions need to play an “active role in modifying preferences, 
generating new options, persuading the parties to move toward in-
creasing compliance with regime norms, and guiding the evolution 
of the normative structure in the direction in the overall objectives 
of the regime.”16  More specifically, international institutions can 
persuade states to comply with international norms through essen-
tial tools of management, including transparency, norms and stra-
tegic interaction, reporting and data collection, and verification 
and monitoring.17  This is not a vertical legal process in which 
norms are imposed on states; rather, it is a horizontal legal process 
in which continuous interaction among states can realign domestic 
priorities and agendas through more transparency, dispute settle-
ment mechanisms, and capacity building, and thus improve com-
pliance over time.18  The Chayeses particularly emphasize trans-
                                               
 12  See id. (describing that treaties reflect the interests of states because they 
are consensual instruments and are accepted and obeyed due to shared norms of 
law abidance). 
 13  Id. at 8 (“The existence of legal obligation, for most actors in most situa-
tions, translates into a presumption of compliance, in the absence of strong coun-
tervailing circumstances.”).   
 14  See id. at 9-17 (explaining that states often fall into noncompliance without 
intent to do so but due to extenuating circumstances). 
 15  Id. at 25-28; see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC 
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 183 (1993) (finding that “the sanction for violating 
the norm is not penal, but the exclusion from the network of solidarity and coop-
eration”). 
 16  CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 1, at 229. 
 17  See id. at 112-96 (reviewing the importance of norms within treaty compli-
ance). 
 18  See id. at 22-28 (underscoring the importance of generating and dissemi-
nating information about parties’ requirements within a treaty to ensure compli-
ance). 
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parency as an important factor in changing the behavior of states, 
as this facilitates coordination among independent actors and pro-
vides reassurance that they are acting in accordance with other 
participants in the regime.19  To enhance transparency, the man-
agement process also includes discourse among multiple stake-
holders, including civil society groups.   
Some realists and constructivists have pointed out limits of the 
managerial approach.  For example, rationalists argue that the 
model is only useful when it concerns coordination games.20  On 
the other hand, Koh, a major proponent of transnational legal pro-
cess, argues that the model does not explain how norms are actual-
ly internalized into the state.21  Nonetheless, in contrast to such al-
ternative theories, the Chayeses’ theory can be particularly useful 
in international regimes concerning transnational business activity 
since coordination and capacity building are key for addressing the 
                                               
 19  See id. at 135 (“[Transparency] provides reassurance that [independent ac-
tors] are not being taken advantage of when their compliance with the norms is 
contingent on similar action by other (or enough other) participants in the re-
gime.”). 
 20  See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1830-33 (2002) (noting that the managerial approach does not 
explain situations in which states act against their own interests in exchange for 
concessions from other states); see also ANDREW T.  GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL 
LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 17 (2008) (explaining that any sensible 
theory of international law must account for and seek to explain both instances of 
state compliance and of violation); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS (1979) (exploring the various theories that explain states’ decision-
making in entering treaties and legally binding obligations with one another); Jack 
L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A 
Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (2002) (examining states’ use of 
moral and legal arguments to advance their agenda). 
 21  See Harold Hongju Koh, Book Review: The New Sovereignty (1997), Faculty 
Scholarship Series, Paper 2098 (arguing that “it says nothing about the means – 
for example, judicial incorporation, legislative embodiment or executive ac-
ceptance – by which a complying state will signal its internal acceptance of the 
relevant international standard.”).  According to Koh, norms are internalized 
through a process of repeated “interactions” characterized by ongoing interpreta-
tion, which over time result in their being incorporated into the domestic legal 
system.  See also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 
YALE L. J. 2599 (1997) (book review) (identifying states’ motivations for observing 
international legal systems); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 
NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996) (contesting the notion that there is no international legal 
scholarship); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International 
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) (unpacking the literature surrounding 
states’ interaction with international law); Harold Hongju Koh, How Is Internation-
al Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L. J. 1397, 1407 (1998) (“True compliance is 
not so much the result of externally imposed sanctions . . . as internally felt 
norms.”). 
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technical and legal complexities surrounding regulation of corpo-
rations.  As it will be further discussed in the next section, the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention specifically aims to regulate such 
transnational business activity in order to enhance coordination for 
detection, investigation of companies that are allegedly involved in 
foreign bribery.  In this aspect, an assessment of the management 
process of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention can provide valua-
ble insight on ways to enhance coordination among states and 
build individual capacity of states for greater state compliance. 
 
2.  ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT IN THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION 
 
 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention entered into force in 1999, 
and thirty-five OECD member countries and eight non-member 
countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Russia, 
and South Africa, have adopted this Convention.  Monitoring is 
carried out by the OECD Working Group on Bribery through a 
rigorous peer-review system based on Article 12 of the Conven-
tion.22  The monitoring system also contains many of the key man-
agement tools proposed by the Chayeses, which include norms 
and strategic interaction, reporting, data collection, verification and 
monitoring, to increase transparency and enhance capacity of 
states for effective compliance.  The next section will explain the 
key features of the management approach outlined in the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention in more detail.  
 
2.1.  Key Features of Management in the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention   
 
Unlike the U.N. Convention against Corruption, which has 
adopted an implementation review system for 177 member states, 
                                               
 22  Convention, supra note 5, at art. 12 (“The Parties shall co-operate in carry-
ing out a programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full im-
plementation of this Convention.  Unless otherwise decided by consensus of the 
Parties, this shall be done in the framework of the OECD Working Group on Brib-
ery in International Business Transactions and according to its terms of reference, 
or within the framework and terms of reference of any successor to its functions, 
and Parties shall bear the costs of the programme in accordance with the rules ap-
plicable to that body.”). 
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the OECD has been able to adopt a more rigorous monitoring 
mechanism that specifically focuses on forty-three member coun-
tries, including the eight non-member countries that are parties to 
the Convention.23  The key feature of the management process is 
the peer review system, which enables independent monitoring 
and production of credible and reliable data.24  In order to evaluate 
the performance of each state, two countries are chosen to lead the 
peer review supported by a team from the OECD Secretariat.25  The 
Working Group conducts assessments based on responses to ques-
tionnaires submitted by states, independent research through on-
site visits in consultation with government officials, law enforce-
ment officials, independent experts, representatives from the pri-
vate sector, and the civil society.26  Participation of various stake-
holders is a key part of the monitoring process, ensuring that all 
opinions are heard by the examiners.27  Apart from these on-site 
                                               
 23  See ROSE, supra note 4, at 97-132 (explaining that participation in the im-
plementation review system under the U.N. Convention against Corruption is 
non-mandatory and many of the provisions under the review system are vague).  
 24  See Peer Pressure: A Related Concept, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/peerpressurearelatedconcept.htm 
[https://perma.cc/SK8W-J8HP] [hereinafter Peer Pressure] (explaining that this 
form of peer pressure is not conducted through legally binding acts as sanctions 
or other enforcement mechanisms, but is instead a means of soft persuasion to 
stimulate states to change).  
 25  THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY ON THE CONVENTION 
ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS OF 21 NOVEMBER 1997 44-46  (Mark Pieth, Lucinda A. Low, & Nicola 
Bonucci eds., 2014) [hereinafter THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A 
COMMENTARY].  See generally Phase 1 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/phase1countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-
briberyconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/KV4W-VEKE].  
 26  The first stage is the preparatory stage, where the evaluated country fills 
out a detailed questionnaire.  Once the lead examiners are selected, a more spe-
cialized follow-up questionnaire and on-site visit is followed in phases two and 
three.  In all procedures, the draft report is prepared by the Secretariat in consulta-
tion with lead examiners and the country examined.  Once the draft report is 
completed, hearings begin, which consist of informal consultations between ex-
aminers, representatives of the examined country and the Secretariat in order to 
clarify any misunderstandings and minimize disagreement.  There is a total of 
two hearings; in the second hearing, the country examined is entitled to include a 
dissenting opinion in the text.  After the written text is completed, based on ap-
proval of the country, it is published on the OECD website.  THE OECD 
CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 44-46. 
 27  Id. (“[T]he private sector and civil society play an essential role in the proce-
dures of the Working Group on Bribery.  Whereas in Phase 1 their contributions 
are introduced in writing and distributed to the Working Group on Bribery as 
‘room documents,’ an elaborate system of hearings during the on-site visits allows 
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visits, the OECD Working Group also has a procedure called the 
”Tour de Table,” which is conducted four times a year.28  This pro-
cedure allows state parties to report on their legislative processes 
and raise questions to each country about foreign bribery cases re-
ported to the public.29  States are required to report on the status of 
each case, and respond to questions on how they have handled 
them.30  The status of these cases is recorded and updated through 
a form of comments called the “Matrix.”31  In addition, in the “Tour 
de Table,” the Working Group addresses specific topics related to 
enforcement as prosecutors from each country respond to ques-
tions provided by their peers.32  This latter set of discussions is con-
fidential, but the material is used in the evaluations.  
A second key feature of this monitoring process is that it is 
conducted in two levels throughout three different phases: a legis-
lative process to ensure that states have adequate legislation in 
place, and an enforcement process to ensure that they are properly 
equipped with the necessary knowledge and capacity to enforce 
the law.  In the legislative process, the Working Group on Bribery 
can make recommendations to amend the scope of application for 
certain legislation.33  In the enforcement process, various elements 
are assessed.  For example, states are at times required to respond 
to queries on the number of investigations and prosecutions com-
menced each year, or other discontinued investigations and the 
reasons for discontinuing them.  Further assessments are made as 
to whether state authorities have created institutional mechanisms 
                                                                                                          
all opinions to be heard by the examiners.”).  
 28  Id.  
 29  Id.  
 30  Id.  
 31  Id.  
 32  Id.  
 33  For example, the U.N. Working Group on Bribery often recommends that 
states expand the scope of their laws on foreign bribery to include third parties.  
Other recommendations include enactment and amendments of laws regarding 
whistleblower protection; obligation of public officials and employees of devel-
opment agencies to report to prosecution authorities; inclusion of the liability of 
legal persons for foreign bribery; increase of sanctions on corporations that are 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive; adoption of nationality jurisdiction for the 
bribery of foreign officials to reach extraterritorial activities; and other policies for 
prosecutorial discretion, to ensure that parties are not influenced by considera-
tions of national economic and political interests.  See generally OECD, 
COMPILATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN THE PHASE 2 REPORTS (2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/45605080.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ C9UF-NY8N].   
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to generate awareness of the laws or have developed early warning 
indicators for government agencies and companies.34  States will 
also evaluate whether there is intra-state cooperation among dif-
ferent agencies including home-country embassies, development-
assistance agencies, foreign and trade ministries, and export fi-
nance institutions between host and home governments.35  
Third, there is regular follow-up after each phase to assess 
whether each state has in practice implemented the specific rec-
ommendations provided by the Working Group.  The state is re-
quired to report to the OECD Working Group after evaluation of 
each phase, to discuss whether it has followed up on the individual 
recommendations and include reasons for not implementing the 
recommendations if they have not done so.  It is first required to 
present orally one year after the recommendation, and subsequent-
ly required to submit a written report on its implementation status 
two to three years later.36  The OECD Working Group on Bribery 
then produces a follow-up report on each phase for each individu-
al country, and concludes whether there has been full implementa-
tion, partial implementation or no implementation for each specific 
recommendation.  These reports are posted on the OECD website 
for the public to access.37  Although the evaluated country is not 
likely to block the decision of the Working Group since it does not 
have the right to veto, it is given ample time to represent its case 
and introduce a dissenting opinion if they find it necessary.38  Pub-
                                               
 34  See generally OECD, COMPILATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN THE 
PHASE 3 REPORTS (2014), http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-
bribery/CompilationofRecommendationsP3ReportsEN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HU9W-AJ2L].  
 35  Based on these assessments, the OECD Working Group often makes rec-
ommendations to raise awareness and training for prosecutors and judges regard-
ing the importance of placing sanctions on corporations, and to adopt guidelines 
to strengthen its intelligence gathering capacity among inter-governmental agen-
cies.  The Working Group also ensures that states are allocating adequate human 
and financial resources, increasing mutual legal assistance with other states, and 
encouraging companies to introduce codes of conduct and compliance programs.  
States are further recommended to incorporate guidelines on public procurement 
to debar companies and individuals involved in illicit conduct; See generally OECD 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, Compilation of 
Recommendations made in the Phase 3 Reports (2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-
bribery/CompilationofRecommendationsP3ReportsEN.pdf. 
 36  THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY, supra note 25, 47.  
 37  Id.  
 38  Id.  The country may find an ally, and the consensus of the Group may be 
blocked, and the text modified, but this is unlikely because states often do not find 
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lishing these reports serves to impose peer pressure on states, 
which can be intensified through involvement of the media and 
public scrutiny.39  
Lastly, the OECD may take extraordinary measures to make 
the peer process more effective.40  If the Working Group on Bribery 
determines that implementation remains insufficient, along with 
additional written reports and oral presentations, it may request a 
second on-site visit, which is referred to as Phase 2bis or 3bis.41  As 
a way to intensify pressure on states, the Working Group on Brib-
ery is even entitled to send official letters to governments, Minis-
ters, Prime Ministers or Presidents, as well as high-level political 
missions to state parties.42  They may at times issue formal public 
statements and press releases for “continued failure to adequately 
implement” the recommendations.43  The OECD has gone so far as 
to threaten the United Kingdom in Phase 2bis in 2008 of a trade 
sanction to speed up the legislative process.44  
                                                                                                          
it in their political and economic interest to give a particular participant preferen-
tial treatment.  
 39  See Peer Pressure, supra note 24 (finding that peer pressure is particularly 
effective when it is made available to the public and the press is actively engaged 
in the story).  
 40  THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 47-
48 (sect.3.2). 
 41  Id.  
 42  Id.  
 43  Id.  The OECD expressed serious concern to France and Spain regarding 
their lack of foreign bribery convictions.  See Press Release, OECD, OECD Serious-
ly Concerned at Lack of Foreign Bribery Convictions in France, But Recognises 
Recent Efforts to Ensure Independence of Prosecutors (Oct. 23, 2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdseriouslyconcernedatlackofforeignbribery
convictionsinfrancebutrecognisesrecenteffortstoensureindepend-
enceofprosecutors.htm [https://perma.cc/T9MC-CC3N] (stating that OECD 
Working Group on Bribery’s report on France gives a list of recommendations, 
while highlighting the country’s positive reforms); see also Press Release, OECD, 
OECD Seriously Concerned by Absence of Foreign Bribery Convictions in Spain 
(Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
brib-
ery/oecdseriouslyconcernedbyabsenceofforeignbriberyconvictionsinspain.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9EPW-83HQ] (addressing the OECD’s concern with Spain’s 
foreign bribery convictions). 
 44  Id.; see also OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2BIS: REPORT ON THE 
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 
RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS (2008) [hereinafter U.K. PHASE 2BIS REPORT], 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/41515077.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5VSH-7X26] (detailing the United Kingdom’s Phase 2bis pro-
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 Overall, these features all include the elements originally pro-
posed by the Chayeses in their managerial theory.  The monitoring 
process has provided a transparent information system and a man-
agerial response system.  Provision of transparent information and 
data has the effect of reassuring states through reliable knowledge 
about respective compliance level, thus deterring a state from con-
templating a violation due to fear of discovery of these violations.  
The managerial response system, on the other hand, is a process of 
continuous discourse in which states are continuously assessed 
and evaluated on their individual performance to determine 
whether there can be further improvement.  This process enables 
states to build their capacity and awareness of relevant issues in 
order to effectively implement the Convention.  The next part will 
present how the assessment was conducted and its findings.  
 
2.2.  Scope and Methodology of Analysis 
 
The main purpose of the assessment is to measure the effec-
tiveness of the management process by analyzing the compliance 
level of states.  Compliance levels can be measured by evaluating 
whether individual states actually took steps to follow up on the 
specific recommendations provided by the OECD Working Group 
on Bribery.  The research was conducted through analysis of re-
ports produced by the OECD Working Group on Foreign Bribery 
from 2000 until 2015.  It specifically examined states’ follow-up 
measures to recommendations provided in Phase 2 and Phase 3, 
which both include the legislative and enforcement processes.45  
Phase 2 reviews the legislative and practical implementation and 
the efficacy of the institutional framework that was examined in 
Phase 1, while Phase 3 focuses on enforcement and other cross-
cutting issues concerning foreign bribery.46  Countries which did 
                                                                                                          
cedures and efforts to combat bribery). 
 45  Phase 3 is not limited to recommendations on enforcement, but further in-
cludes general recommendations provided in 2009 and other outstanding recom-
mendations from Phase 2.  See Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Con-
vention, supra note 6.  
 46  See OECD, FIGHTING THE CRIME OF FOREIGN BRIBERY: THE ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION AND THE OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY 6 (2017), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Fighting-the-crime-of-foreign-
bribery.pdf [https://perma.cc/2539-KAZL] (breaking down the implementation 
of the Convention into its four phases). 
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not take part in Phase 3 before 2015 were not included in the study. 
 During the follow-up process of Phases 2 and 3, the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery determines whether the state in ques-
tion has fully implemented the recommendation, partially imple-
mented the recommendation, or made no implementation at all.  In 
some cases, it may determine that the matter is still under consid-
eration.  Based on these decisions made by the Working Group, in 
order to conduct a quantitative assessment, these determinations 
are numerically coded by the author: “1” if the state has fully im-
plemented the recommendation; “0.5” if it has partially imple-
mented the recommendation; “0.25” if the implementation status is 
still under consideration; and “0” if the recommendation has not 
been implemented at all.  These numbers are added, and a per-
centage is provided based on the total number of recommenda-
tions of each state.  To ensure the most comprehensive picture pos-
sible, information was cross-checked across all data to maximize 
accuracy and detail.  The independent variable was the individual 
recommendations, and the dependent variable was the follow-up 
status of each state. 
Such a quantitative approach to analyzing the reports of twen-
ty-three countries can provide broad coverage of the general per-
formance of OECD member states in response to the management 
process under the Convention.  However, there are certain limita-
tions.  The quantitative assessment may not necessarily prove cau-
sation because there may be other factors that contributed to im-
plementation of the specific recommendations.  Other factors such 
as changes in the domestic economy or changes in regulation of 
corporations may have affected compliance.  Broad enforcement of 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) may also have 
been a factor in influencing the behavior of States.  Nevertheless, as 
these were designed to accommodate the domestic circumstances 
of each state, the recommendations significantly reduce such risks.  
Moreover, the qualitative assessment of the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Korea provides more support for the causal rela-
tionship that exists between the OECD recommendations and im-
plementation status of each country.  
 
2.3.  Findings  
 
 Figure 1 on the next page presents an overview of the follow-
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up status for each state.  It shows that in general, states have taken 
more action to follow up on recommendations in Phase 2, with an 
average rating of 62%, while taking less action in Phase 3 with an 
average rating of 56%.  These ratings are produced by adding all 
the follow-up ratings of each individual country that participated 
in Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the monitoring process as shown in Fig-
ure 1, creating a percentage based on the total number of partici-
pating countries.  The follow-up rating of each individual country 
is based on a percentage of individual recommendations imple-
mented for each phase.  These findings are consistent with the en-
forcement data produced by the OECD in 2013 since countries that 
have some of the highest enforcement ratings in figure 1 have ac-
tually placed sanctions on corporations for foreign bribery.47  This 
2013 report shows that Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Norway, United Kingdom and the United States were the 
only countries that placed sanctions on legal persons for foreign 
bribery.48  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 47  See OECD, WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY: 2013 DATA ON ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION (2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/Working-Group-on-Bribery-Enforcement-Data-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H7ZP-72Y4] (comparing data collected from the forty parties 
to the Anti-Bribery Convention from 1999 to December 2013). 
 48  Id.; see also Transparency International, EXPORTING CORRUPTION, PROGRESS 
REPORT 2015: ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATTING 
FOREIGN BRIBERY 6 (2015), http://www.ti-
aus-
tria.at/uploads/media/Exporting_Corruption_Progress_Report_2015_EN_01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VMD9-WKGR] (stating that twenty-two of the forty-one 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention signatories have failed to prosecute any foreign 
bribery case since they joined the Convention).  
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Figure 1: Follow-Up Rating for Each State 
 
*Countries in the top 25 of GDP Ranking Table (World Bank, 2015) 
listed according to their GDP ranking49  
 
Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that countries with the highest 
GDPs tend to have higher enforcement ratings on average.  Aus-
tralia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States all 
have ratings above 55%.  However, there are exceptions.  For in-
stance, France, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and Finland have lower fol-
low-up ratings relative to their economic size.  In these countries, 
                                               
 49  World Bank, Gross Domestic Product Ranking Table 2015, 
https://data.world/worldbank/gdp-ranking 
[https://data.world/worldbank/gdp-ranking].  
 Phase 2 Phase 3 
United States of America* 63% 80% 
Japan* 78% 56% 
Germany* 56% 56% 
United Kingdom* 63% 67% 
France* 96% 38% 
Italy* 44% 48% 
Canada* 48% 65% 
Republic of Korea* 61% 75% 
Australia* 73% 62% 
Spain* 30% 26% 
Mexico* 66% 41% 
Netherlands* 78% 64% 
Switzerland* 60% 68% 
Sweden* 66% 77% 
Norway* 100% 75% 
Denmark* 27% 75% 
Finland* 61% 32% 
Czech Republic 64% 48% 
Hungary 50% 50% 
Slovak Republic 78% 67% 
Luxembourg 50% 48% 
Bulgaria 65% 40% 
Iceland 39% 20% 
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other political and legal factors may have reduced the willingness 
and capability to carry out the individual recommendations for en-
forcement.  In the case of France, the OECD expressed serious con-
cerns over its implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention in 
2014, stating notably that public prosecutors were not given statu-
tory guarantees to exercise their functions without undue political 
influence.50  Additionally, Spain, Mexico, Italy, and Finland were 
unable to follow up with many of the recommendations due to 
lack of legal reform or deficiencies in their respective penal codes.51 
While some may be critical of the work of the OECD manage-
ment system because more than half of the state’s parties have not 
sanctioned corporations for foreign bribery based on the OECD en-
forcement data, Figure 1 does illustrate that states have been mak-
ing incremental changes to enhance their capabilities, particularly 
in the legislative process.  Such changes are more visible in Figures 
                                               
 50  See Press Release, OECD, Statement of the OECD Working Group on Brib-
ery on France’s Implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention (Oct. 23, 2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/statement-of-the-oecd-working-group-on-
bribery-on-france-s-implementation-of-the-anti-bribery-convention.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8JWA-HEZU] (“French authorities committed, through a 
statement by their Minister of Justice, to adopt other measures, including decisive 
changes to their criminal policy.  However, reforms which would have given pub-
lic prosecutors the necessary statutory guarantees to exercise their functions with-
out undue political influence which is required for the proper administration of 
justice, did not materialise.”).  
 51  See OECD, SPAIN: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 
4 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Spain-Phase-3-Written-
Follow-Up-Report-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4SZ-CGRB] (“A majority of the 
recommendations that Spain has not implemented (12) are related to deficiencies 
in Spain’s Penal Code. . . .”); OECD, MEXICO: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 3-5 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/MexicoPhase3WrittenFollowUpEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YSQ-6GM2] 
(noting that legislation on foreign bribery offence was not enacted); OECD, ITALY: 
FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 4-5 (2014), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ItalyP3WrittenFollowUpReportEN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/74VQ-LJDJ] (discussing the lack of action with regards to for-
eign bribery offences); OECD, FINLAND: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2013), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/FinlandPhase3WrittenFollowUpReportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZ7Z-
HUZZ] (“Of particular concern is the lack of action by Finland to make the neces-
sary legislative amendments. . . .”); see also Press Release, OECD, In Support of Its 
Active Enforcement Efforts, Italy Should Urgently Extend the Time Frame for 
Prosecuting Foreign Bribery, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
brib-
ery/insupportofitsactiveenforcementeffortsitalyshouldurgentlyextendtimeframef
orprosecutingforeignbribery.htm [https://perma.cc/QKK6-W88N] (reporting 
that existing limits to the statute of limitations is the primary reason that signifi-
cant enforcement efforts have led to only limited results).  
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2 and 3, which categorize the areas in which states have followed 
up to each individual recommendation.  The numbers in Figures 2 
and 3 refer to the sum of individual recommendations provided to 
all countries evaluated, categorizing them into different areas in 
which the recommendations were given, as distinguished under 
the OECD country reports.  The sum of these individual recom-
mendations is further divided into whether there was full imple-
mentation (“F”), partial implementation (“P”), implementation 
under consideration (“C”), or no implementation (“N”).  For ex-
ample, in Figure 2: Phase 2, under the category of awareness-
raising, twenty-seven recommendations were fully complied, 29 
recommendations were partially complied, and only four recom-
mendations were not complied with.  
 
Figure 2: Phase 2  
 
 
Category 
Total Number of 
Recommendations 
F P C N 
Awareness-Raising  27 29  4 
Detection, Reporting, Investigation & 
Prosecution, Prevention 
66 33 6 24 
Prosecution, Enforcement 30 11 1 7 
Sanction, Confiscation 8 7  11 
Taxation, Accounting, Auditing, Money 
Laundering  
23 19  12 
Offence of Foreign Bribery  8 2 1 8 
Liability of Legal Persons  2 3  10 
Jurisdiction, Territory  4 2  1 
Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance, In-
ternational Cooperation 
1    
Official Development Assistance, Public 
Procurement  
1 4  1 
Statistics  4 4   
Resources  2    
Statute of Limitations, Limitation Period  1    
Amendment  1    
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Figure 3: Phase 3  
 
 
Category 
Total Number of 
Recommendations 
F P C N 
Awareness-Raising  17 14  9 
Detection, Reporting, Investigation & 
Prosecution, Prevention 
57 46  34 
Prosecution, Enforcement 10 4  4 
Sanction, Confiscation 12 13  24 
Taxation, Accounting, Auditing, Money 
Laundering  
44 39  30 
Offence of Foreign Bribery  8 9  20 
Liability of Legal Persons  5 11  15 
Jurisdiction, Territory  4 2  4 
Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance, In-
ternational Cooperation 
5 7  4 
Official Development Assistance, Public 
Procurement  
16 8  17 
Statistics  1 3  1 
Resources  6 4   
Statute of Limitations, Limitation Period  2   3 
F= Full Implementation, P= Partial Implementation, C= Implemen-
tation under Consideration, N= No Implementation 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show that in both Phase 2 and Phase 3, states 
have made their greatest efforts to enhance detection, reporting, 
and investigation and prosecution capabilities for preventing for-
eign bribery, and to raise awareness on domestic foreign bribery 
laws.  Most of the recommendations are also related to these areas.  
More specifically, in Phase 2, a total of 129 recommendations were 
provided to states in the area of detection, reporting, investigation, 
prosecutions and prevention and 77% of these recommendations 
were fully or partially implemented.  Similarly, in Phase 3, 75% of 
the recommendations were fully or partially complied with in the 
same category.  Compliance level for awareness-raising in Phase 2 
is high since 93% of the recommendations had been fully or partial-
ly complied with.  There is also a relatively high level of compli-
ance for recommendations regarding measures to enhance detec-
tion through taxation, accounting, auditing and money laundering 
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since 78% of the recommendations in Phase 2, and 73% of the rec-
ommendations in Phase 3 had been fully or partially implemented.  
For recommendations regarding prosecution and enforcement, 
which primarily aim to ensure that prosecution and enforcement is 
effective, about 80% of the recommendations were fully or partially 
implemented.  
However, it is surprising to note that there have been fewer fol-
low-up measures for recommendations regarding liability of legal 
persons and sanctions on corporations – one of the key elements of 
the Convention.  This applies to both Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the 
monitoring process.  More specifically, for liability of legal persons 
in Phase 2, a total of 15 recommendations had been provided and 
only 33% of these recommendations had been fully or partially im-
plemented.  In Phase 3 for liability of legal persons, 52% of the rec-
ommendations had been fully or partially implemented.  On the 
other hand, for sanctions and confiscations, about half of the rec-
ommendations were not implemented in the enforcement process.  
A representative from the OECD Anti-Corruption Division 
suggested in an interview that there are certain challenges in en-
forcing liability of legal persons due to the fact that corporate crim-
inal responsibility is still a new concept in many countries.52  For 
example, during Phase 3, the Working Group found that the Slo-
vak Republic “does not know the concept of criminal liability of le-
gal persons.”53  It is also difficult to detect the actual crime as it of-
ten involves complex corporate structures that concern multiple 
jurisdictions, requiring more resources and training for enforce-
ment.54  As a result, many states confront challenges in legislation 
and enforcement on liability of legal persons and placing sanctions 
on corporations.  
Despite such challenges, the management process influenced 
all forty-three signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to 
adopt a provision on liability of legal persons for foreign bribery, 
and this new legal framework in turn has increased pressure on 
companies to enhance their compliance measures in their global 
                                               
 52  Telephone Interview with Representative from the OECD, Anti-
Corruption Division (Sept. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Telephone Interview].  The views 
expressed are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the OECD or of 
the parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
 53  OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 16 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/SlovakRepublicphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XWE-NGUD]. 
54  Telephone Interview, supra note 52. 
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operations.55  All state parties also now have laws in place to reach 
extraterritorial activities of companies based on the nationality 
principle.56  Moreover, with regard to recommendations on liability 
of legal persons, certain countries did not comply with recommen-
dations to incorporate liability of legal persons into their domestic 
legal systems in phase 2 of the monitoring process, but these coun-
tries eventually incorporated it as a result of OECD’s extraordinary 
measures after phase 2 evaluations were completed.  For example, 
in phase 2, countries such as Bulgaria, Luxembourg, and Slovak 
Republic initially did not follow up recommendations to incorpo-
rate liability of legal persons into their domestic system, but even-
tually did so following continuous pressure from the OECD Work-
ing Group on Bribery.  In the case of Luxembourg, it did not even 
adopt the concept at the time the written follow-up report was 
submitted in 2006.  It was only in the oral follow-up report in 2007 
that it informed the Working Group of a bill placed before Parlia-
ment to introduce criminal liability of legal persons.57  Accordingly, 
the OECD Working Group Phase 2 evaluation team examined the 
bill and issued reservations on certain elements of this bill.58  In 
March 2010, Luxembourg’s Minister of Justice finally informed the 
OECD Secretary-General that the law introducing criminal liability 
of legal persons had been adopted.59  This example demonstrates 
                                               
 55  Id.  
 56  Id.  The OECD continuously encouraged states to interpret their domestic 
laws more broadly to reach extraterritorial activities of companies.  See THE OECD 
CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 333 (pointing out that 
the phrase under art. 4(1) of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention stating “in whole 
or in part in its territory” was continuously repeated “mantra-like, in every WGB 
country evaluation”); see also OECD, MID-TERM STUDY OF PHASE 2 REPORTS 151-52 
(2006) [hereinafter PHASE 2 MID-TERM REPORT], http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/anti-briberyconvention/36872226.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD7G-HEXJ] 
(recommending states to apply the nationality jurisdiction not only to individuals 
but to legal persons).  
 57  See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN LUXEMBOURG 14 (2011), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Luxembourgphase3reportEN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T9K2-8G6Z] (“The bill would amend the Penal Code, inserting 
into it a chapter on ‘penalties applicable to legal persons’, and also the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, to which would be added a section on ‘proceedings against 
legal persons’.”). 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id.; see also PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC, supra note 53, at 16 (reporting that the Slo-
vak Republic did not establish liability of legal persons for foreign bribery even 
during the Phase 2 written follow-up in 2008.  Therefore, the OECD Working 
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that it takes a great deal of time to undergo legal reform, particu-
larly when incorporating new concepts, but with assistance from 
the OECD Working Group, states are able to incorporate the neces-
sary legislation to comply with the Convention.  
While the Ministry of Justice in most countries initiated efforts 
to incorporate liability of legal persons for foreign bribery into their 
systems, Chile represents an interesting case in which company 
representatives at an on-site visit expressed support for such a 
measure.60  The Ministry of Justice found that it would be difficult 
to achieve such legal reform, but Chilean business representative 
insisted that it was in the interest of businesses to push for such ob-
ligations because of the country's reliance on the global trading 
system.61  Chile eventually did incorporate a provision on liability 
of legal persons in 2009.62  
In this regard, these findings not only support the Chayeses’ 
managerial theory, but further advance the theory by illustrating 
how management can induce compliance among states through 
the shaping of domestic laws.  By recommending states to adopt 
the concept of liability of legal persons and other relevant stand-
ards, the OECD management process helped harmonize domestic 
laws and level the playing field for states and businesses.  Align-
ment of international standards further eased administrative bur-
dens for companies and induced them to adopt more robust due 
diligence measures in their global operations.  
In terms of enforcement, OECD enforcement data has shown 
that more than half of the state parties have not sanctioned corpo-
rations for foreign bribery.63  However, Figures 2 and 3 do show 
                                                                                                          
Group decided in September 2009 that the Slovak Republic was obliged to inform 
regularly at each plenary about the development of this issue until the recom-
mendation to adopt a new law on liability of legal persons for foreign bribery was 
implemented in a satisfactory manner.  The Slovak Republic eventually reported 
in June 2010 that it amended its Criminal Code on April 27, 2010). 
 60  OECD, CHILE: PHASE 2 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON 
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 41 (2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/chile/39540391.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5N5-YTWM]. 
 61  Id. 
 62  OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN CHILE 14 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ChilePhase3ReportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NVB-CY54] (“In 2009, 
Chile enacted Law 20 393 to create criminal liability of legal persons for foreign 
and domestic bribery, money laundering, and terrorism of financing. . . .”). 
 63  See OECD, WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, supra note 47, at 1 (highlighting 
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that there have been developments to enhance enforcement capa-
bilities through raising awareness, enhancing detection and report-
ing, and other investigation and prosecution techniques based on 
recommendations of the OECD.  More specifically, Figure 2 
demonstrates that in Phase 3, out of 137 recommendations to all 
countries in the area of detection, reporting, investigation and 
prosecution and prevention, 57 recommendations were fully im-
plemented, and 46 recommendations were partially implemented.  
Compliance level for awareness-raising is particularly high, 
which has helped influence large corporations to incorporate nec-
essary compliance measures.64  In terms of detection, the OECD 
has focused on building sufficient inter-agency communication be-
cause detection of foreign bribery can involve multiple sources.65  
The establishment of independent anti-corruption agencies in cer-
tain countries has been particularly effective for awareness-raising 
and coordinating agency efforts.66  In addition, the OECD has en-
couraged states to impose reporting obligations on officials and 
even impose sanctions for non-compliance.67  As a result, by 2006, 
almost half of the parties required their public officials to report 
suspected foreign bribery to law enforcement authorities.68  Never-
theless, the 2014 Foreign Bribery Report found that there were an 
extremely low number of concluded cases, leading the OECD to 
propose the need to strengthen reporting by public authorities.69  
                                                                                                          
that seventeen parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention have since imposed sanc-
tions for foreign bribery). 
 64  See PHASE 2 MID-TERM REPORT, supra note 56, at 129 (“SMEs lag behind 
large companies in the creation and implementation of codes of conduct and 
compliance programmes that serve, among other purposes, to educate manage-
ment and staff on issues of what constitutes an offence and what to do if confront-
ed with a situation involving foreign bribery.”). 
 65  Id. at 135. 
 66  See id. at 136 (“Centralising the exchange of information and ensuring reg-
ular inter-agency communication have been achieved by some Parties through the 
creation of anti-corruption bodies that perform an oversight and co-ordinating 
role.”). 
 67  See id. at 131, 137-39 (“In the Slovak Republic, foreign diplomatic person-
nel are required to report all crimes involving foreign bribery to the law enforce-
ment authorities in the Slovak Republic as well as to the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, Ministry of Interior and the Slovak prosecutor’s office.”). 
 68  See id. (clarifying that these countries include Belgium, Bulgaria, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico and the Slovak Republic). 
 69  See OECD, OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF 
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS 33-34, https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264226616-
en.pdf?expires=1522951942&id=id&accname=ocid177112&checksum=9D054D0C3
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Lastly, the OECD ensured that states were not influenced by execu-
tive decisions in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention.70  For 
example, it issued press release statements to express concerns 
over the lack of independence of prosecutors in France.71  
 
2.4.  Concluding Observations  
 
In sum, the OECD monitoring process has influenced states to 
take greater action, but states face certain challenges when it comes 
to implementing recommendations on liability of legal persons for 
foreign bribery.  Figure 2 has shown that there is a relatively low 
level of compliance with regard to recommendations on liability of 
legal persons.  This is due to the fact that the concept of liability of 
legal persons is still relatively new in certain states and sufficient 
human and financial resources are needed to enforce liability on 
legal persons.  The data in Figure 1 does illustrate that capacity of 
states can influence their compliance levels since states with higher 
economic and administrative capacity tend to have higher follow-
up ratings to the recommendations.  
In this regard, the management process may not have full im-
pact, but it has led to considerable advancements by harmonizing 
domestic laws and leveling the playing field for states and busi-
nesses.  A significant aspect of the management process is that it 
has been able to influence all forty-three state parties to incorporate 
the concept on liability of legal persons within their domestic legal 
                                                                                                          
790C15D7F2769B7D08443BD [https://perma.cc/W86G-W9NW] (2014) (“The ex-
tremely low number of concluded cases . . . suggests a need for strengthened for-
eign bribery detection and reporting mechanisms within these agencies, along 
with greater cross-agency cooperation.”  Seventeen percent of foreign bribery cas-
es are self-reported by companies to law enforcement authorities.). 
 70  See Convention, supra note 5, at art. 5 (“Investigation and prosecution of 
the bribery of a foreign public official shall be subject to the applicable rules and 
principles of each Party.  They shall not be influenced by considerations of nation-
al economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with another State or the 
identity of the natural or legal persons involved.”). 
 71  See Statement of the OECD Working Group on Bribery on France’s Im-
plementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 50 (“French authorities 
committed, through a statement by their Minister of Justice, to adopt other 
measures, including decisive changes to their criminal policy.  However, reforms 
which would have given public prosecutors the necessary statutory guarantees to 
exercise their functions without undue political influence which is required for the 
proper administration of justice, did not materialise.”). 
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systems. 72  Even countries that had never recognized such a con-
cept began to incorporate it or adopt similar measures as a result of 
OECD’s managerial response system.  All states parties also have 
sufficient laws to reach extraterritorial activities of companies since 
the OECD ensured that the nationality principle not only extended 
to individuals but also legal persons.  This has been crucial in har-
monizing formal law and thus reducing gaps in the legal system.73  
As a result, this new legal framework has led many global compa-
nies to become more alert of their liability risks, and thus incorpo-
rate effective compliance measures into their internal systems 
throughout their global operations.74  These findings further ad-
vance the Chayeses’ managerial theory by illustrating how man-
agement can facilitate coordination among states through incorpo-
ration of new legal concepts and structures. 
Furthermore, management has been able to induce states to 
strengthen their domestic capacity for investigation and prosecu-
tions.  According to the data, states, either fully or partially, im-
plemented most of the recommendations on awareness-raising, ca-
pacity building for detection, reporting, investigations, and 
prosecutions in both the legislative and enforcement process.75  
States also implemented a large percentage of recommendations 
regarding jurisdiction, mutual legal assistance, and investment of 
resources.  In terms of legal coordination among states, the Tour de 
Table has been an important forum for prosecutors to exchange in-
formation and expertise.76  The OECD also ensured that states were 
not influenced by executive decisions.77  The next section will ex-
plore country-specific case assessments to determine how the 
                                               
 72  Id.  Before the monitoring process, only a few countries adopted the con-
cept on liability of legal persons, but all states parties now criminalize foreign 
bribery and recognize liability of legal persons.  
 73  THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 48-
50 (“there is widespread agreement that the OECD managed – astonishingly rap-
idly – to harmonize formal law”); see also Mark Pieth, From Talk to Action: The 
OECD Experience, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY, CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A 
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE? 157 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2013) 
(arguing that this system has established a new link between the responsibilities 
of the public and private sector).  
 74  Telephone Interview, supra note 52. 
 75  See Figures 2 and 3, infra.  
 76  See Telephone Interview, supra note 52 (revealing that there are frequent 
meetings between law enforcement officials, forming an informal network.  These 
forums were important for leading to adoption of the 2009 recommendations).   
 77  Id.  
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OECD and other organizations have been able to influence the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Korea.  
 
3.  COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ASSESSMENTS 
 
This part aims to analyze how the management process under 
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have been able to influence 
states to comply with their international obligations.  It focuses on 
the United Kingdom and the Republic of Korea as two illustrative 
cases based on reports by international organizations and govern-
ments and on qualitative interviews conducted with relevant prac-
titioners and independent experts.  
 
3.1.  United Kingdom  
 
The United Kingdom signed the OECD Convention on Decem-
ber 17, 1997 and ratified it on December 14, 1998, but the U.K. did 
not enact a new bribery law immediately following its ratification.  
Parliament rather concluded in a review completed on November 
16, 1998 that existing legislative and common law provisions on 
corruption, including the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906 
which includes punishment of bribery of agents and persons in a 
public office, were already sufficiently in place to implement the 
Convention.78  Existing legislation also applied to entities, both in-
corporated and unincorporated, that have legal personality.79  
                                               
 78  See OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 1 (1999) [hereinafter U.K. PHASE I 
REPORT], http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/2754266.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYB5-SPET] (further stating 
that other relevant laws include the Criminal Law Act 1997 and the Criminal Jus-
tice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998); see also OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: 
REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION, 
PHASE I BIS REPORT 2 (2003) [hereinafter U.K. PHASE I BIS REPORT], 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/2498215.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z5DC-3TGU] (“The pre-existing offences of bribery in the 
United Kingdom are based on both common law and statute.  Common law is de-
veloped through judicial decisions, each of which forms a precedent binding on 
courts of the same or lower level.  The statutory provisions on corruption are con-
tained in three different criminal statutes, the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 
1889, the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 
1916 . . . ”).  
 79  See U.K. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 78, at 8 (explaining that that for crimi-
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Yet, in the first part of the monitoring process, the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery found that existing U.K. laws were not 
in compliance with the standards under the Convention, urging 
the U.K. government to enact new legislation as a matter of priori-
ty.80  In Phase 1 of the review process, the OECD Working Group 
identified several deficiencies in the legislative and common law 
provisions on corruption.81  More specifically, the OECD pointed 
out that the offences did not expressly apply to the category of for-
eign bribery, and it expressed concerns over the fact that the of-
fence almost never applied to a foreign bribery case in practice.82  
Due to lack of an express provision, implementation of other obli-
gations under the OECD Convention, including provision of mu-
tual legal assistance, was even more difficult for the U.K. govern-
ment.83  Moreover, courts often limited its jurisdictional scope to 
territorial jurisdiction and it was recommended by the OECD that 
the U.K. government should extend its jurisdictional scope for acts 
that occur entirely outside the territory of the U.K.84  In terms of en-
forcement, the OECD expressed concerns over its wide discretion-
ary powers to initiate a prosecution based on the “evidential and 
public interest test” and recommended that the U.K. government 
fully respect Article 5 of the Convention, which requires member 
states to prohibit consideration of national economic interest, the 
potential effect upon relations with another state, or the identity of 
the natural or legal persons involved when deciding on the public 
interest of the state.85  
                                                                                                          
nal responsibility of legal persons, mens rea can be attributed to the company 
based on identification of someone in the organization with an appropriate level 
of authority who possesses the mental state in question). 
 80  See generally id.; see also U.K. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 78, at 1 (examining 
the changes brought about in the United Kingdom’s corruption laws following 
the new legislation). 
 81  U.K. PHASE I BIS REPORT, supra note 78, at 4 (“. . . the Working Group voiced 
concerns about the uncertain applicability of U.K. law to the bribery of foreign 
public officials.”).  
 82  See id. (explaining that there was only one reported case, the Raud case of 
1989, which was cited in relation to foreign bribery).  
 83  Id.   
 84  Id. at 5 (“The Working Group further noted that under the existing law, 
the courts did not have jurisdiction to try a bribery offence unless some part of the 
corrupt transaction took place in the United Kingdom.  The Working Group rec-
ommended that the U.K. government consider the extension of the scope of the 
bribery offences beyond its territorial jurisdiction in order to cover acts occurring 
entirely outside the territory of the United Kingdom.”).   
 85  See id. (further expressing concerns over the requirement of the Law Of-
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In response to these evaluations, the U.K. government ex-
pressed its intention to reform its corruption laws.86  It did so pur-
suant to the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001, which 
was a response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and in-
cludes a section on bribery and corruption.87  Part 12 of this legisla-
tion extended the scope of existing anti-corruption legislation, in-
cluding the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 and 1916, allowing 
application of bribery offences extraterritorially and establishing 
nationality jurisdiction for acts taking place outside the U.K.88  As a 
result, the OECD Working Group found that U.K. laws on foreign 
bribery had been strengthened by clarifying the application of the 
common law and statute law on foreign bribery, but because the 
Act was amended, some essential elements of the offences contin-
ued to remain uncertain.89  Therefore, the Working Group recom-
mended the U.K. to enact a comprehensive anti-corruption statute 
to address these uncertainties.90 
In Phase 2 of the monitoring process, which included an on-site 
visit of the U.K. in July 19-23 of 2004, the OECD Working Group 
re-examined the implementation status of the U.K. government, 
and it came to the conclusion that no significant progress had been 
made since Phase 1 of the monitoring process.  The OECD recog-
nized that the U.K. authorities made substantial efforts to prepare a 
                                                                                                          
ficer’s consent to prosecute of a bribery offence under the Prevention of Corrup-
tion Acts).  
 86  Id. at 1 (“[T]he United Kingdom stated its intention to carry out a general 
reform of corruption law as soon as parliamentary time permitted.”).  
 87  See Legislation Government U.K., Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/contents 
[https://perma.cc/GS7W-R9EG] (denoting changes to the Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001). 
 88  See U.K. PHASE I BIS REPORT, supra note 78, at 5-10 (providing that existing 
bribery offences are also offences if they are committed outside the U.K., or if they 
involve either foreign agents or principals having no nexus with the U.K., or 
holders of a foreign public office, or officials of foreign bodies or authorities, and 
also providing jurisdiction over U.K. nationals or bodies incorporated in the U.K. 
who commit one of the offences regardless of where it is committed).  
 89  See id. at 16-17 (explaining that the definition of foreign public official and 
other issues relating to the element itself, including the notion of offering, promis-
ing or giving, is still uncertain).  
 90  See id. at 17-18 (discussing the Working Group’s recommendation that 
consideration should be given in the new anti-corruption statute to cover the no-
tions of offering, promising, or giving, and including a definition of the nature of 
the benefit conferred that reflects “any undue pecuniary or other advantage,”, 
along with a provision that the offence of foreign bribery may be committed for 
the benefit of a third party).  
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draft legislation for a more comprehensive anti-corruption statute 
and make efforts to engage in consultations, but the recommended 
legislative changes had not been made.91  Moreover, there was no 
specific case law on bribery of foreign public officials and there 
was lack of statistical data to evaluate its implementation process.92  
During the on-site visit, the OECD further found that there was 
lack of inter-agency coordination between investigation and prose-
cution authorities, and certain practitioners pointed out the lack of 
clarity among the different legislative instruments in place.93  Most 
importantly, despite several allegations of U.K. companies in-
volved in foreign bribery, no company or individual had been in-
dicted or tried for the offence of bribing a foreign public official 
since the U.K. ratified the Convention, which was unusual for a 
country with such a large economy.94  Therefore, the Working 
Group recommended through its 2005 Phase 2 Report that the U.K. 
enact a comprehensive foreign bribery legislation at the “earliest 
possible date.”95  
 After Phase 2 of the monitoring process, on March 2007, the 
U.K. was required to submit a written follow-up report which ex-
plains actions taken by the U.K. in response to the 2005 recom-
mendations provided by the OECD Working Group.96  Through 
                                               
 91  OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE OF 
THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON 
COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 7 (2005), 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/34599062.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZU4-P2JG].  
 92  Id.  
 93  Id. at 7-8 (“[T]he examining team noted significant fragmentation within 
investigation and prosecution authorities; practitioners interviewed during the 
on-site visit indicated a lack of clarity among the different legislative and regula-
tory instruments in place.”).  
 94  Id.  
 95  Id. at 62 (“The lead examiners share the widely-held view that the current 
substantive law on foreign bribery in the U.K. is characterized by complexity and 
uncertainty.”).  
 96  See id. at 80-82 (providing recommendations to raise awareness of the 
Convention and the foreign bribery offence among law enforcement authorities, 
establish an obligation for civil servants to report on possible instances of foreign 
bribery, reform laws to clarify and unify laws for prevention and detection, 
strengthen investigation by providing sufficient human and financial resources to 
the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), amend as necessary the code and manuals for 
prosecution, consider adopting administrative and civil sanctions for legal per-
sons in addition to criminal liability, and revisit policies of agencies focusing on 
international development).  
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this report, it was found that the U.K. government had made sig-
nificant progress in raising awareness and increasing resources for 
policy capacity in order to strengthen investigations.97  The Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO) was, in particular, given a more central role in 
foreign bribery cases.98  The U.K. government further expressed in 
its follow-up report that the U.K. was of the view that its laws were 
in compliance with the Convention and that lack of prosecutions 
were not a result of any doubts from law enforcers about the scope 
of the law, but rather, a result of operational challenges in gather-
ing evidence from abroad.99  Nevertheless, concerns remained due 
to an absence of a foreign bribery legislation and deficiencies in the 
laws on liability of legal persons.100  
Most of all, the Working Group was concerned with the discon-
tinuance of a major foreign bribery investigation of BAE SYSTEMS 
                                               
 97  OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2, FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHASE 2 RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2007) [hereinafter U.K. 
PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORT], 
https://www.oecd.org/unitedkingdom/38962457.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZAM-
46MQ].  
 98  Id. (“The revised MOU calls for referral of all foreign bribery allegations to 
the SFO in the first instance and gives the SFO a role in reviewing (“vetting”) each 
allegation at the outset; this allows it to determine whether it is appropriate for it 
to take on the case itself or to guide the process of attributing the case to another 
agency.”).  
 99  Id. at 6-7 (“The slow pace of reform appears to be attributable at least in 
part to the U.K.’s view, as expressed in the Follow-Up Report (at p.1), that is cur-
rent law complies with the Convention and that change is only a ‘desirable meas-
ure of law reform’”); see also HOME OFFICE (U.K.), BRIBERY: REFORM OF THE 
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACTS AND SFO POWERS IN CASES OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN 
OFFICIALS, A CONSULTATION PAPER 8 (2005), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070305120356/http:/www.homeof
fice.gov.uk/documents/450272/2005-cons-bribery%3Fview=Binary 
[https://perma.cc/4T8S-H5JQ] (“There is no requirement in the OECD, or any 
other, Convention to have a specific offence of the bribery of a foreign public offi-
cial. . . . The OECD Group are concerned that there have been no prosecutions us-
ing the powers in the 2001 Act.  This however is not due to any doubts from law 
enforcers about the scope of the law, but may be related to operational difficulties 
in securing evidence in cases overseas, particularly in developing countries.”).   
100  See U.K. PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORT, supra note 97, at 6-7 (expressing seri-
ous concerns considering public statements made by senior U.K. law enforcement 
officials about the significant defects in the law that would preclude prosecution 
of certain cases); see also U.K. PHASE 2BIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 19 (2008) (ex-
pressing concerns on the issue of liability by addressing the following: “1) only 
one company has ever been prosecuted for bribery since the U.K. adopted bribery 
legislation in 1906 and the conviction was overturned on appeal; 2) the doctrinal 
requirements for corporate liability preclude any likelihood of liability for most 
companies; and 3) the law was such as to dissuade in practice any attempts to 
prosecute.”).  
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plc and the Al Yamamah defense contract with the government of 
Saudi Arabia.101  BAE, which is based in Britain, was allegedly in-
volved in arms deals with Saudi Arabia and other countries, but 
the British government halted British efforts to investigate the 
deals in 2006 due to national security concerns.102  In January 2007, 
the Working Group eventually issued a press release expressing 
serious concerns about the discontinuance of the investigation and 
that they would continue to consider the matter in conjunction 
with the follow-up report.103  Consequently, the Working Group 
began to closely examine the case as it raised important questions 
relating to investigation and prosecution capabilities and the defi-
ciencies in the U.K. foreign bribery offence. 104  In this process, the 
media played a critical role in further pressuring the U.K. govern-
ment by exposing the discontinuance of the investigations to the 
public.105 
During the Phase 2bis monitoring phase in 2008, there were 
signs that the U.K. was beginning to enforce its laws to prevent 
foreign bribery because, in August 2008, the U.K. reported its first 
conviction for foreign bribery in a case investigated by the City of 
London Police Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit (OACU).106  Yet, the 
                                               
 101  U.K. PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORT, supra note 97, at 4; see also BAE Systems: 
Timeline of Bribery Allegations, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Dec. 21, 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/8216172
/BAE-Systems-timeline-of-bribery-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/2K5D-
QWDG] (tracing major events during the investigation into BAE Systems and 
documenting the close of bribery investigations into BAE Systems by the SFO).  
 102  See Christopher Drew & Nicola Clark, BAE Settles Corruption Charges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/business/global/06bribe.html 
[https://perma.cc/DZS9-Q5HG] (“The investigation began in Britain.  But Tony 
Blair, the prime minster at the time, halted the British efforts to investigate the 
deals with Saudi Arabia in 2006, after Saudi leaders threatened to stop providing 
the British government with tips on terrorism, according to documents later dis-
cussed by a British court.”).  
 103  U.K. PHASE 2BIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 5. 
 104  See id. at 8 (explaining the factual record in the Al Yamamah case).  
 105  See, e.g., David Leigh & Rob Evans, BAE Accused of Secretly Paying £1bnto 
Saudi Prince, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 7, 2007, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/07/bae1 
[https://perma.cc/DBU9-52AK] (reporting that the investigation had been halt-
ed); Sean Rayment, Saudi BAE Systems Case: Weapons Deal and Alleged Bribes, 
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), May 17, 2008, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1976606/Saudi-BAE-Systems-case-
Weapons-deals-and-alleged-bribes.html [https://perma.cc/R8HD-Q8XZ] (point-
ing out that the investigation was closed before key bank records were obtained). 
 106  U.K. PHASE 2BIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 7 (“According to media reports, 
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Al Yamamah case continued to be a matter of concern for the 
Working Group as the case was undergoing judicial review in the 
U.K.107  Previous recommendations to reform deficiencies in the 
law were also not implemented.  Thus, the OECD Working Group 
continued to urge the U.K. in its October 2008 Phase 2bis report to 
enact effective foreign bribery legislation at the earliest possible 
date and adopt appropriate legislation to achieve effective corpo-
rate liability for foreign bribery.108   
As a result, in 2010, the U.K. finally enacted the Bribery Act to 
strengthen the country’s legislation on bribery offences by includ-
ing a specific offence of bribery by foreign public officials.109  Sec-
tion 7 of the Bribery Act further includes a new offence of failure of 
commercial organizations to prevent bribery, which supplements 
the existing regime on corporate liability under the common law 
identification theory.110  In order to reach extraterritorial acts of 
companies based in the U.K., sections 12(2) and (3) of the new Act 
also provide extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute foreign brib-
ery committed by persons.111  Therefore, during the Phase 1ter 
                                                                                                          
the case involved the 65-year-old managing director of CBRN Team, a U.K. securi-
ty company, who paid GBP 83 000 in bribes in 2007-2008 to two Ugandan officials 
in relation to a GBP 210 000 contract.  The briber received a five-month jail sen-
tence suspended for one year.”); see also Megan Murphy, Ugandan Jailed for Taking 
Security Bribe, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Sept. 22, 2008, 
https://www.ft.com/content/a6ecaa60-88c7-11dd-a179-0000779fd18c 
[https://perma.cc/Y2MF-VWGE] (reporting on the Ugandan conspiracy and the 
OACU’s role in bringing the case to court).   
 107  See OECD, UNITED KINGDOM PHASE 2BIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 71-72 
(recommending that the U.K. continue enacting effective modern foreign bribery 
legislation).   
 108  Id.; see also Interview with Representative from the Anti-Corruption & 
Civ. Rts. Comm’n (ACRC), Int’l Aff. Div., in Seoul, S. Kor. (May 27, 2015) [herein-
after ACRC Interview] (explaining how the OECD pressured the U.K. to adopt the 
Bribery Act).  
 109  See Bribery Act 2010 (c. 23) (U.K.) (including general bribery offences, 
bribery of foreign pubic officials, failure of commercial organizations to prevent 
bribery, prosecution and penalties, and other supplementary and final provi-
sions).  
 110  Id.; see also OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 1TER 10-13 (2010) [hereinafter 
U.K. PHASE 1TER REPORT], https://www.oecd.org/unitedkingdom/46883138.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N6T9-JFXV] (evaluating the new provision under the U.K. 
Bribery Act); U.K. PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORT, supra note 97, at 3 (finding that Sec-
tion 7 of the U.K. Bribery Act is in compliance with the approach recommended 
by the Good Practice Guidance on Implementing Specific Articles of the Conven-
tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transaction).   
 111  Bribery Act 2010, supra note 109.  
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monitoring process, the Working Group found that this new legis-
lation adopts most features of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
and commended the U.K. for enacting this new legislation, but also 
urged the U.K. to meet the April 2011 deadline for entry into 
force.112  
Yet, implementation was delayed due to lobbying from U.K. 
business groups.113  For example, the Confederation of British In-
dustry (CBI) expressed concerns that the Act would hinder com-
petitiveness of U.K. companies, requesting for more time to pre-
pare for the legislative changes.114  Nevertheless, the Working 
Group continued to pressure the U.K. to enact the Act as soon as 
possible and expressed concerns over its delay.115  The Working 
Group even went as far as to threaten the U.K. that it may consider 
increasing due diligence over U.K. companies through their com-
mercial partners or Multilateral Development Banks such as the 
World Bank.116  Moreover, it reminded the U.K. that other jurisdic-
tions could potentially play a role in further sanctioning U.K. com-
panies such as through the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act with 
its wide extraterritorial application.117  In a media interview, the 
                                               
 112  See U.K. PHASE 1TER REPORT, supra note 110, at 19 (“When it enters into 
force, the Act will be a major improvement on the prior patchwork of U.K. bribery 
laws.”); see also Press Release, OECD, OECD’s Gurría Welcomes Passage into Law 
of U.K. Bribery Bill (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdsgurriawelcomespassageintolawofukbrib
erybill.htm [https://perma.cc/4BHS-FNYG] (noting that the chair of the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery stated, “I’m pleased that the U.K. has made such pro-
gress.”). 
 113  ROSE, supra note 4, at 91.  
 114  Id.; see also Simon Bowers, Serious Fraud Office Vows to Pursue Corruption 
Foreign Companies, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Mar. 25, 2011), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/mar/25/serious-fraud-office-
overseas-firms-bribery-act [https://perma.cc/F6QZ-UACE] (describing that de-
lays would be beneficial to U.K. companies who are caught in the middle).  
 115  See Press Release, OECD, U.K.: Chair of OECD Working Group on Brib-
ery Concerned Over Delay of New Bribery Act (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ukchairofoecdworkinggrouponbriberyconcernedover
delayofnewbriberyact.htm [https://perma.cc/Q3RY-PXRB] (quoting the Chair of 
the Working Group, Mark Pieth, who expressed disappointment that the passage 
of the Act would be delayed).  
 116  See U.K. PHASE 2BIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 4; see also ROSE, supra note 4, 
at 90 (“While the precise meaning of such due diligence is unclear, the Chairman 
could have been referring to the World Bank’s ability to debar companies that 
have engaged in a corrupt practice on connection with a World Bank project, such 
that they may be no longer be awarded Bank-financed contracts for a period of 
time.”).  
 117  ROSE, supra note 4, at 90-91.  
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Chairman of the OECD also reported that they may consider black-
listing British companies.118  Such monitoring efforts by the OECD 
and continuous high-level official visits continuously pushed the 
U.K. government to enforce the Bribery Act.119  
After senior government officials from the U.K. government 
provided assurance to the OECD Secretary-General that it would 
issue guidance for the Bribery Act to enter into force,120 the Bribery 
Act finally came into force on July 1, 2011.  At this point, two con-
victions of companies for foreign bribery had already been 
made.121  As such, through its 2012 Phase 3 report, the Working 
Group commended the U.K. for the significant increase in en-
forcement on foreign bribery cases since Phases 2 and 2bis, and for 
publishing the Guidance to Commercial Organizations on the U.K. 
Bribery Act.122  The Working Group also recognized that the U.K. 
government had made substantial efforts to raise awareness of the 
Bribery Act, particularly through its overseas missions.123  At the 
same time, the Working Group continued to provide further rec-
ommendations in order to increase transparency and resources.124  
                                               
 118  Id. at 89-91; see also David Leigh, British Firms Face Bribery Blacklist, Warns 
Corruption Watchdog, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Jan. 31, 2011), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/jan/31/british-firms-face-
bribery-blacklist [https://perma.cc/6ZFN-ELPJ] (discussing how British compa-
nies may have to deal with blacklisting on an international level due to the gov-
ernment’s actions with the Bribery Act). 
 119  Telephone Interview, supra note 52. 
 120  See Press Release, OECD, OECD Statement on U.K. Guidance for the 
Bribery Act (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/oecdstatementonukguidanceforthebriberyact.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6FGC-67CH] (quoting the OECD Secretary-General, Angel 
Gurría, that the OECD has been assured “from the highest levels of the U.K. gov-
ernment that they would issue guidance” in implementing the Bribery Act).  
 121  See OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2BIS FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHASE 2BIS RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2011), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/48066020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F795-8GBD] (highlighting that the two convictions show a 
greater level of enforcement of the Phase 2bis evaluation). 
 122  See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (2012) [hereinafter U.K. PHASE 3 REPORT], 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/UnitedKingdomphase3reportEN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/46XS-9DAM] (acknowledging the U.K.’s increased enforce-
ment and urging the U.K. to continue taking such measures). 
123  Id.  
124  Id.; see also Press Release, OECD, U.K. Increases Enforcement of Foreign 
Bribery, but Concerns Remain about Transparency and Resources (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconven-
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In addition, the BAE Systems case was also resolved through a set-
tlement with the SFO for 30 million pounds, which was a record 
criminal fine for a company, and was also settled with the Depart-
ment of Justice under the FCPA for $400 million.125   
Overall, assessment of the United Kingdom illustrates how 
management process can induce change among states to incorpo-
rate new laws and make amendments in their legal systems and 
enact policies in order to comply with international norms.  The 
U.K. faced constant challenges in adopting these norms, including 
issues concerning national security with regard to investigations 
surrounding the BAE Systems case and resistance from the busi-
ness community for concerns that U.K. companies may lose com-
petitiveness.  Nonetheless, the OECD continued to convince U.K. 
senior officials about the importance of leveling the playing field 
for international business and U.K.’s responsibility as a G20 coun-
try to set an example for other countries.  The OECD also utilized 
external sources, such as due diligence procedures under multilat-
eral development banks and the U.S. FCPA, as a way to further 
pressure the U.K. government.  Most importantly, the OECD ac-
tively engaged with the media to further publicize their concerns, 
including delays in the legislation process.  All of these efforts have 
contributed to the adoption of the U.K. Bribery Act, and the OECD 
continues work closely with the U.K. government to enhance the 
effectiveness of the Bribery Act.126  
 
 
3.2.  Republic of Korea   
 
                                                                                                          
tion/ukincreasesenforcementofforeignbriberybutconcernsremainabouttransparen
cyandresources.htm [https://perma.cc/UA33-EE93] (including recommendations 
that the U.K. maintain the Serious Fraud Office’s role and resources in criminal 
foreign bribery cases, avoid confidentiality agreements, and adopt a roadmap to 
extend the Convention to Overseas Territories).  
 125  James Thompson, BAE Systems Pays $400m to Settle Bribery Charges, 
INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (Feb. 6, 2010), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/bae-systems-pays-400m-
to-settle-bribery-charges-1891027.html [https://perma.cc/2N6X-B4XE].  
 126  For most recent report, see generally OECD, IMPLEMENTING THE OECD 
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION PHASE 4 REPORT: UNITED KINGDOM (2017), 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/UK-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7582-XMEN] (evaluating the U.K.’s foreign bribery risk and its 
methods of addressing these issues).  
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 The Republic of Korea has been among the fastest growing 
OECD economies, with double-digit export volume growth over 
the past twenty years, making it the seventh-largest exporter and 
fifteenth-largest economy in the world.127  This was accomplished 
largely on the strength of exports through major chaebol companies 
or enterprise groups comprised of diversified family-owned con-
glomerates.  Following ratification of the OECD Convention on 
Foreign Bribery in 1997, Korea enacted the Act on Preventing Brib-
ery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transac-
tion (FBPA) in December 1998.128  This new law included a provi-
sion on corporate liability under Article 4 of the statute, which 
states that a legal person may be subject to a fine “in the event that 
a representative, agent or employee or other individual working 
for the legal person commits the offence.”129  As new robust laws 
regulating transnational corporate behavior were introduced, there 
were widespread concerns that the law may weaken economic ac-
tivities abroad, but the Korean government took the position that 
participating in these international efforts would enhance the 
country’s credibility and attract more investors.130  As stated in a 
commentary by the Prosecutor’s Office, the primary objective of 
implementing the FBPA was to enhance the country’s international 
credibility.131  
                                               
 127  OECD, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 10 (2014), 
https://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Overview_Korea_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3JM3-35PU].  
128  See Act on Preventing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transaction (S. Kor. 1999), translated in OECD online database, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/2378002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/34M6-GZ6P].  The Act was enacted on December 28, 1998 and 
came into effect at the time of the entry into force of the Convention on February 
15, 1999.  
 129  Id. at art. 4 (“In the event that a representative, agent, employee or other 
individual working for legal person has committed the offence as set out in Arti-
cle 3(1) in relation to its business, the legal person shall also be subject to a fine up 
to 1,000,000,000 won in addition to the imposition of sanctions on the actual per-
former.  In case that the profit obtained through the offence exceeds a total of 
500,000,000 won, it shall be subject to a fine up to twice the amount of the profit.  
If the legal person has paid due attention or exercised proper supervision to pre-
vent the offence against this Act, it shall not be subject to the above sanctions.”).  
 130  See PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, COMMENTARY TO THE 
FBPA (in Korean) (Jan. 4, 2004), 
http://www.spo.go.kr/spo/info/study/data01.jsp?mode=view&board_no=34&
article_no=28888 [https://perma.cc/A5D8-V8CW] (stating that taking part in the 
efforts to build a transparent international order can enhance the international 
credibility of the country and attract more international investors).  
 131  Id.  
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Korea’s new law was also in line with domestic interests.  Fol-
lowing the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the public sought reform, 
viewing this crisis as the result of corrupt practices by corporate 
and government officials.132  Due to the long history of military-
backed rule, which lasted from 1948 to 1992, a collusive relation-
ship between government and big business, or chaebols, predomi-
nated.133  Reform towards a more democratic system could be ob-
served by 1993, but political candidates continued to acquire large 
campaign funds from the private sector.134  As the public began to 
demand more transparency with the outbreak of the 1997 crisis, 
President Kim Dae-Jung was able to win votes by placing corrup-
tion at the top of his political agenda.135  Meanwhile, with the de-
velopment of civil society in Korea throughout the 1990s, non-
governmental organizations also began to play a key role in the an-
                                               
 132  See generally David T. Johnson, The Prosecution of Corruption in South Korea: 
Achievements, Problems, and Prospects, in LAW REFORM IN KOREA 48 (Tom Ginsburg 
ed., 2004) (suggesting that corporate scandals have become a regular and central 
feature of political life); Craig P. Ehrlich & Kang Dae-Seob, A Look at Korean Corpo-
rate Codes of Conduct, in LAW REFORM IN KOREA 95-113 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2004) 
(discussing internal codes of conduct in Korean chaebol companies).  
 133  Kyongsoo Lho & Joseph Cabuay, Corruption in the Korean Public and Pri-
vate Sectors, in CORRUPTION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 85 (Nicholas Tarling 
ed., 2009); see also VINAY BHARGAVA & EMIL BOLONGAITA, CHALLENGING 
CORRUPTION IN ASIA: CASE STUDIES AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 147 (World Bank 
ed., 2004), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/791211468741662651/pdf/275800
PAPER0Challenging0corruption.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSM9-7XLE] (describing 
that the chaebols in the Korean economy contributed to economic health by driving 
exports, but also caused the economy to become extremely centralized and highly 
dependent on bureaucratic decisions).  
 134  See Kyongsoo Lho & Joseph Cabuay, supra note 133, at 85 (explaining that 
politicians accepted large sums of illegal contributions from the chaebols, who in 
return were given major government procurement contracts by the government, 
an exchange that increased the financial power of corporations to influence elec-
tions and government policy-making.); see also ANDREW WEDEMAN, DOUBLE 
PARADOX: RAPID GROWTH AND RISING CORRUPTION IN CHINA 20-33 (2012) (demon-
strating how South Korea was an exception to the rule that corruption harms eco-
nomic growth, given the way in which its institutionalization forged and sus-
tained a symbiotic relationship between conservative, pro-development political 
parties and business interests).  
 135  See JON S. T. QUAH, CURBING CORRUPTION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES: AN 
IMPOSSIBLE DREAM? 329 (2011) (describing that his policies included improving 
Korea’s ranking on Transparency International’s CPI from a ranking of 43rd in 
1998 to 20th by 2003); see also Kyongsoo Lho & Joseph Cabuay, Corruption in the 
Korean Public and Private Sectors, supra note 133, at 91 (providing that the difference 
between Kim Dae Jung’s actions and those of his predecessors was the fact that 
prevention and exposure would be used in combination with reinforced punitive 
measures to fight corruption).   
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ti-corruption movement by generating more public awareness and 
pushing legislators to take more aggressive action.136  In fact, civil 
society groups had originally proposed the Anti-Corruption Act of 
July 2001 for passage in 1996.137 
As such, the 1998 FBPA Act was largely supported by the pub-
lic, and was followed in 2001 by supporting legislation that includ-
ed the Anti-Corruption Act.138  This stipulated the creation of an 
independent implementation agency, the “Korea Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (KICAC),” which was later inte-
grated into the Act on Anti-Corruption & the Establishment and 
Operation of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission 
(ACRC) on February 29, 2008.139  The ACRC currently plays a cen-
tral role in raising awareness and handling complaints.  More spe-
cifically, the agency has launched various networks of public-
private consultative bodies, while providing guidelines and educa-
tional courses for corporate ethical management.140  The activities 
of the ACRC are not limited to the domestic sphere; they have also 
provided technical assistance to other countries with MOU part-
ners, such as Indonesia and Bhutan.141  In addition, one of its main 
                                               
 136  QUAH, supra note 135, at 330 (“The Anti-Corruption Act of July 2001 was 
originally proposed for legislation in 1996 b the People’s Solidarity for Participa-
tory Democracy (PSPD) and supported by TI Koreas, the Citizens’ Coalition for 
Economic Justice and the Citizens’ Association for anti-Corruption.”).  
 137  Id.  Civil society groups included TI Korea, the Citizens’ Coalition for 
Economic Justice and the Citizens’ Association for Anti-Corruption.  These organ-
izations participated in public hearings, legislation requests, national assembly 
person signature drives, campaigning, rallies, and television broadcast discus-
sions during 2000-2001 to advocate passing of the bill.  See also VINAY BHARGAVA & 
EMIL BOLONGAITA, supra note 133, at 151 (showing how nongovernmental organi-
zations have been quite effective in promoting good practices as their public in-
volvement has grown).  
        138  OECD, STEPS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE THE OECD CONVENTION 
ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 90 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGB-Steps-
Taken-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MR6-5Y94]. 
 139  Id.  
 140  See generally ANTI-CORRUPTION & CIV. RTS. COMM’N (ACRC), ANNUAL 
REPORT 2014 (2014) [hereinafter ACRC 2014 ANNUAL REPORT], 
http://www.theioi.org/downloads/dflq7/Korea_ACRC_Annual%20Report_201
4_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2X7-84R6] (documenting the ACRC’s efforts to 
prevent corruption and protect people’s rights and interests and recommending 
improvements for sixty-three unreasonable systems that cause complaints and 
corruption to agencies in charge).   
 141  See id. at 17-18 (showing that the ACRC signed MOUs on anti-corruption 
cooperation with Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Mongolia, respectively, in or-
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functions of the ACRC is to receive, investigate and handle com-
plaints filed by the public.142  In 2014, a total of 30,038 complaints 
were filed and 28,744 cases were handled by this agency.143  
Along with these legal measures, Korean officials have made 
various efforts to effectively prevent foreign bribery based on rec-
ommendations of the OECD Working Group on Bribery.  These ef-
forts range from raising awareness about the issue to enhancing 
detection capabilities through auditing and accounting, strengthen-
ing whistleblower protection laws, and encouraging use of over-
seas representation, such as Korean development agencies and Ko-
rean embassies to aid with detection.144  In May 2011, Korea 
launched a new intelligence-gathering system in order to strength-
en its capacity for investigating crimes that contain international 
elements, including foreign bribery, tax evasion and international 
organized crimes.  This system, which functioned in cooperation 
with the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
and the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office,145 was useful in following up 
                                                                                                          
der to build anti-corruption capacity and transfer anti-corruption policies to these 
countries).  
 142  Id. at 23-46 (“The ACRC receives and handles ‘public complaints,’ which 
refer to (general) complaints such as opinions, suggestions, and proposals of the 
people to the government, especially cases in which inconveniences, grievances, 
or the infringement of the people’s rights occur because of the illegal, unfair, or 
passive practices (including factum and nonfeasance) of administrative organiza-
tions.”).  
 143  See id. at 32 (describing that complaints can be handled by providing a 
corrective recommendation, expression of opinions, agreement, mediation, guid-
ance of deliberation, dismissal, rejection, transfer, referral, guidance or reply).  
 144  See OECD, KOREA PHASE 2 REPORT: THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION 
ON COMBATTING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATTING BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 4 (2004) [hereinafter KOREA PHASE 2 
REPORT], http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/33910834.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS6M-KSZZ] (outlining the 
structure of the Report and showing that Korean government provided guidelines 
for different agencies).  Korean embassies have been directed to report allegations 
of foreign bribery committed by Korean companies or individuals to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Seoul.  The report is then forwarded to the Minis-
try of Finance and Economy, the Korea Independent Commission Against Cor-
ruption, law enforcement, and prosecutorial bodies.  Korean authorities further 
provided the Korea Export Insurance Corporation and Korea Export-Import Bank 
with more power to demand documents and information from their clients in or-
der to prevent and detect foreign bribery that takes place through accounting and 
auditing.  Id. 
 145  See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN KOREA 23 (2011) [hereinafter KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT], 
https://www.oecd.org/korea/Koreaphase3reportEN.pdf 
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and investigating nine allegations made by the media in 2011.146  
As a result, that same year, the OECD stated that Korea had made 
“notable progress” in implementing the OECD Convention, par-
ticularly in the area of intelligence gathering.147  
Aside from OECD recommendations, another effective man-
agement tool in influencing Korea to adopt new legislation has 
been the use of extraordinary measures by the Working Group.  
For example, in Phase 2 of its monitoring process, the OECD ex-
pressed concerns over the limited scope with respect to the appli-
cation of the whistleblower protection law enacted in 2002, which 
only applied to the public sector.  Accordingly, the OECD recom-
mended that Korea extended its reach to the private sector. 148  
When the government did not take adequate follow-up measures 
to comply with this recommendation, the Working Group filed of-
ficial complaints to high-level officials, including the Minister of 
                                                                                                          
[https://perma.cc/2T4Q-V9JS] (describing that they have strengthened their ca-
pacity through the following measures: “1) Regular updates by the Ministry of 
Justice to the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office on allegations in the international me-
dia; 2) A new special team within the Office of Criminal Intelligence Planning, 
Supreme Prosecutor’s Office is established to focus on gathering of criminal in-
formation and enforcement; 3) A new task for the International Criminal Affairs 
Division at the Ministry of Justice to support foreign information gathering in 
close cooperation with the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea.  The Ministry 
of Justice plays the coordinating role.”). 
 146  KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 145, at 23 (“Three of these cases had 
been closed by the time of the on-site visit, and the Korean embassies were still 
waiting for information in the six other cases.  The Korean authorities explained 
that the three cases had been closed because information obtained through the 
relevant Korean embassies indicated “there is no reason for investigations.”  In at 
least two of these cases, this conclusion was based on reports from the embassies 
that related charges had not been laid in the foreign countries.  No preliminary 
investigative steps were taken in Korea to identify possible leads, such as inquir-
ing whether the companies in question were conducting internal investigations.  
Following the on-site visit three more pre-investigations were closed based on in-
formation received through the relevant Korean embassies.”). 
 147  See Press Release, OECD, Korea Making Notable Progress on Fighting 
Foreign Bribery; Further Improvements Needed, Says OECD (Oct. 19, 2011) [here-
inafter OECD Korea Press Release], http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconven-
tion/koreamakingnotableprogressonfightingforeignbriberyfurtherimprovements
neededsaysoecd.htm [https://perma.cc/PN4P-E58Y] (emphasizing Korea’s ef-
forts in improving its intelligence gathering capacity, but also suggesting that it 
should focus more on the investigatory stage). 
 148  See KOREA PHASE 2 REPORT, supra note 144, at 21 (“To strengthen its efforts 
in this area, they recommend that Korea considers extending whistleblower pro-
tection provided by the ACA to those who report foreign bribery to KICAC, and 
to those who report suspicions of foreign bribery to government agencies other 
than KICAC.”).  
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Justice, and issued public press release statements about Korea’s 
non-compliance.149  These complaints were further used as sources 
to convince members of the National Assembly to enact a new 
whistleblower protection law that extended to the private sector.150  
Eventually, this pressure led to the enactment of the Act on the 
Protection of Public Interest Whistleblowers in 2011.151  Similar ex-
traordinary measures were involved in the enactment of other leg-
islation, such as the provision on small facilitation payments.152  As 
such, public press statements, combined with on-site visits by 
OECD senior officials can serve to alert high-level officials of the 
importance of an issue and to intensify pressure on the Korean 
government to comply with the recommendations.153  
With regard to enforcement of the liability of legal persons, Ko-
rean authorities have increased their prosecutions against corpora-
tions for foreign bribery since the OECD monitoring process came 
into place.  It was reported in 2011 that Korea had prosecuted a to-
tal of nine companies since 2002 based on the implementing legis-
lation of the Anti-Bribery Convention.154  According to 2014 en-
forcement data reports, it has sanctioned four companies in total.155  
Yet, OECD examiners have found that this provision is not utilized 
as frequently as it could be. 156  More specifically, they found that in 
many of the cases in which conviction could have been sought, on-
ly three out of nine prosecution cases actually sought conviction of 
the company itself.157  This is largely due to an underlying percep-
tion among legal professionals that corporations cannot commit 
                                               
 149  ACRC Interview, supra note 108. 
 150  Id.  
 151  Id.; see also KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 145, at 34-35 (outlining re-
sponsibilities under the “Enforcement Decree” of the Act on the Protection of Pub-
lic Interest Whistleblowers, including providing an act related to the violation of 
the public interest). 
 152  ACRC Interview, supra note 108; see also KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 
145, at 7 (recommending that the Republic of Korea periodically review its poli-
cies and approaches on facilitation of payments in accordance with the 2009 Rec-
ommendations of the OECD).  
 153  Interview with Professor Kim Jun-Ki, Yonsei University, in Seoul, S. Kor. 
(Jul. 27, 2015).  
 154  OECD Korea Press Release, supra note 147.  
 155  OECD, 2014 DATA ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
(2015), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Working-Group-on-Bribery-
Enforcement-Data-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH6G-VWDG]. 
 156  KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 145, at 17. 
 157  Id.  
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crimes.158  As expressed by one academic scholar during the on-site 
visit, criminal liability of corporations as legal persons is still a 
“theoretically difficult issue.”159  Yet, this concept is clearly not 
completely absent, as it has been incorporated into other areas of 
law including the Securities and Exchange Act, Monopoly Regula-
tion, Fair Trade Act and Labor Standards Act, and the Terrorism 
Financing and Drug Trafficking Act.160  
Given the challenges mentioned above, the OECD urged Kore-
an authorities to raise awareness about the importance of the pro-
vision on liability of legal persons, and to increase sanctions on 
companies for effective prevention.161  In response, the Ministry of 
Justice and Korea’s independent anti-corruption agency have in-
creased efforts to educate Korean authorities, law enforcement of-
ficials and the general public about the Foreign Bribery Act 
through various training sessions, seminars, conferences and com-
pliance guidelines for companies.162  The agency has made addi-
                                               
 158  Telephone Interview with Judge Mo Seongjun, Gwnagju District Court, S. 
Kor. (Nov. 17, 2015).  Korea is passive when it comes to recognizing corporate 
criminal responsibility due to an underlying perception that crimes can only be 
committed by natural persons.  Id.   
 159   KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 145, at 17.  
 160   See id. at 18 (explaining that the concept is recognized under the Foreign 
Bribery Prevention in International Business Transactions Act (FBPA), Unfair 
Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (UCPA), Financial In-
vestment Services and Capital Markets Act (FTRA), Proceeds of Crime Act 
(POCA), Terrorism Financing Act (FTA), and Drug Trafficking Act (DTA)); see also 
Allens Arthur Robinson, ‘Corporate Culture’ as a Basis for the Criminal Liability 
of Corporations, 56–57 (Feb. 2008), https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Allens-Arthur-
Robinson-Corporate-Culture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DC8H-ZDYY] (stating that in order for a corporation to be 
held liable, it must be proven that the offence was committed “in relation to the 
business,” and that the individual intended to act for the legal person, even 
though a corporation may be able to avoid liability if it took “concrete and specif-
ic” steps to avoid the offence through due diligence measures).   
161  See KOREA PHASE 2 REPORT, supra note 144, at 17-18 (reporting that the lead 
examiners recommended for Korean authorities to raise more awareness among 
policymakers and prosecutors about the importance of prosecuting legal persons 
for violations of the FBPA). 
162  See OECD, KOREA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 9-10 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/KoreaP3WrittenFollowUpReportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/F759-
MNQK] (describing that the Ministry of Justice provided training on the FBPA to 
prosecutors, investigators and prospective lawyers at the Legal Research and 
Training Institute and the Judicial Research and Training Institute in 2013.  In 
2012, the Ministry of Justice further introduced the Compliance Officer System in 
the Commercial Act to raise more awareness in the private sector through a series 
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tional efforts to discuss the new law with public organizations and 
business entities, including small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).163  More recent developments include the enactment of the 
Kim Young-ran Act, which has strengthened corporate liability 
provisions by recognizing that corporations can be responsible for 
the acts of their employees.164  
On the issue of extraterritoriality, while Korea has increased 
sanctions against corporations under the implemented legislation, 
most of the prosecutions concerned acts that took place on Korean 
soil.  More specifically, most of these cases involved Korean indi-
viduals and companies who had participated in the bribery of pro-
curement authorities at the United States army base on Korean 
soil.165  There was an ongoing investigation initiated in May 2011 
regarding bribes paid to a Korean subsidiary of a Chinese-
controlled airline company, but this also involved an offense taking 
place on Korean territory.166  Despite such challenges, on the 
whole, Korea has strengthened its capacity for overseas detection 
and investigation.  For example, embassies have been directed to 
report allegations of foreign bribery committed by Korean compa-
nies or individuals to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 
Seoul. 167  The report is then forwarded to the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy, the Korea Independent Commission Against Cor-
ruption, law enforcement, and prosecutorial bodies.168  Korean au-
                                                                                                          
of seminars and conferences.  The ACRC has published “Best Practice Casebook 
on Ethical Management,” and consistently distributed the “OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention Guidebook” to the public.).  
 163  See ANTI-CORRUPTION & CIV. RTS. COMM’N (ACRC), ANNUAL REPORT 2012 
52-64 (2012) (reporting that the ACRC held a meeting on January 18, 2012, distrib-
uting the guidelines to more than 870 inspectors from 1003 public organizations, 
and the assessments were made to 662 target organizations with about 250,000 
respondents); see also KOREA PHASE 2 REPORT, supra note 144, at 3.  
 164  See generally Kim Young-ran Act (2016), available at 
http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=183553&efYd=20161130#0000 (in Kore-
an) [https://perma.cc/5ZPV-ZBT7] (referring to the anti-graft law which was first 
proposed in August 2012 by Kim Young-ran, former head of the Anti-Corruption 
and Civil Rights Commission). 
 165  See KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 145, at 5 (“[T]he majority of these 
cases involved the bribery of foreign military staff on Korean soil”). 
 166  Id. at 10.  
 167  OECD, KOREA: PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE PHASE 2 RECOMMENDATIONS 3-4 (2007) [hereinafter KOREA PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP 
REPORT], http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/38239546.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8GV-N69A]. 
 168  Id.  
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thorities have additionally signed MOUs with foreign countries to 
exchange information.169  As a result, a number of cases involving 
extraterritorial conduct that came to light through media allega-
tions managed to reach the pre-investigation stage where, with the 
help of Korean embassies, authorities were able to gather some in-
formation.170  Although some of these cases were eventually closed 
due to lack of action by foreign courts, or insufficient information 
to proceed with an investigation,171 the OECD noted Korea’s pro-
gress for prosecuting a case and working on three new allegations 
that took place abroad in 2011.172  Moreover, wide extraterritorial 
application of the FCPA by the U.S. is further pushing Korea to be-
come more alert to liability risks that their own companies may 
face abroad.173 
These government efforts to combat foreign bribery can be at-
tributed to the active participation of multiple stakeholders, includ-
ing civil society groups, business associations and independent ex-
perts, in providing a variety of viewpoints.  For example, during 
the on-site visit, a number of civil society groups expressed their 
concerns about Korean authorities’ unwillingness to pursue corpo-
rations for foreign bribery and their low level of sanctions.174  It 
was further revealed in the course of the visit that business associa-
tions were not even aware that businesses could be held liable for 
foreign bribery under Korean law.175  The Working Group noted 
                                               
 169  ACRC 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 140, at 17-18.  
 170  Id.  
 171  Id.  
172  OECD Korea Press Release, supra note 147.  
173  See Korean Construction Firms Operating Abroad Need to be Cautious of Brib-
ery (in Korean), CNEWS (Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://www.cnews.co.kr/uhtml/read.jsp?idxno=201111171104370150503 
[https://perma.cc/432H-QAQ4] (explaining that Korean authorities need to take 
greater action against their own companies operating domestically and abroad to 
ensure that they are not held liable under the U.S. FCPA.  It reports that the U.S. is 
increasing the number of prosecutions under the FCPA, and that Korean compa-
nies represent no exception under either the FCPA or U.K. Bribery Act).  See also 
Interview with Professor Kim Jun-Ki, supra note 153 (explaining that wide extra-
territorial application of the FCPA is alerting Korean companies of their liability 
risks).  
 174  KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 145, at 17; see also Interview with Yoo 
Han-Bum, Secretary-General of Transparency International, in Seoul, Republic of 
Korea (Jul. 28, 2015) (describing Korean government’s lack of willingness to sanc-
tion corporations, and that more efforts need to be made to abolish the broad de-
fense measures for companies in current foreign bribery laws). 
 175  Id.  
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that during a Parliamentary Inspection of the Supreme Court in 
2010, Korean Congressman Lee Ju Young had already criticized the 
courts for imposing minimal sanctions for bribery offences in gen-
eral.176  All of these observations were noted as part of the OECD’s 
recommendations, demonstrating how the participation of stake-
holders can be key to the management process when it comes to 
enhancing transparency and incentivizing states to take greater ac-
tion.  Moreover, increased transparency can pressure states to pro-
vide more accurate information, and because the reports are pub-
lished based on unanimous decision, the monitoring process can 
provide credible information to the public.  
In addition, the OECD worked closely with regional organiza-
tions such as the Asian Development Bank in increasing awareness 
and the capacity of Asian states by initiating the ADB/OECD Anti-
Corruption initiative for fighting corruption in the Asia Pacific in 
1999.177  Through this initiative, which included thirty-one member 
states, the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific 
was developed in 2001.178  The OECD did propose a robust peer 
review system as a way to monitor the implementation process, 
but Asian states favored a more “peer learning process in an in-
formal environment” since they can be more open about the prob-
lems they face, rather than being taught from the “top.”179  Some 
                                               
 176  Id.  
177  See generally Supporting the Fight Against Corruption in Asia and the Pacific: 
The ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/ 
[https://perma.cc/N3LU-MC9B] (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (detailing the region’s 
commitment to implement “. . . standards for sustainable safeguards against cor-
ruption in the economic, political and social spheres of the countries in the re-
gion.”).  
 178  OECD, ADB/OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE FOR ASIA AND THE 
PACIFIC: COMBATING CORRUPTION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, ANTI-CORRUPTION 
ACTION PLAN FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (2001), 
http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-
corruptioninitiative/meetingsandconferences/35021642.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F8UW-F7YA].  The plan was endorsed in Tokyo by Bangla-
desh, Cook Islands, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Malay-
sia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singa-
pore, and Vanuatu.  
 179  See ADB/OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ADB/OECD INITIATIVE FINAL REPORT 2 (2009) [herein-
after ADB/OECD INITIATIVE FINAL REPORT], 
http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-
corruptioninitiative/meetingsandconferences/44084819.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5N8V-RNYC] (describing that the ADB/OECD initiative is re-
garded to be a “peer learning process in an informal environment. . . .”); see also 
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have even pointed out that this is more compatible with Asia’s 
non-confrontational culture.180  As a result of this greater freedom, 
despite the less formal setting, member states were more inclined 
to participate and consider the standards put forth under the Ac-
tion Plan since they were involved in developing the standards in 
accordance with their Asian values.181  All of these efforts have 
contributed to compliance efforts in Korea.  
In sum, the monitoring process contributed to, first, raising 
more awareness among public officials on international anti-
bribery norms, and second, to enhancing detection through 
strengthening whistleblower protection and inter-agency coordina-
tion in Korea. Korea has also begun to sanction companies for for-
eign bribery and corruption.  Even though most of these cases in-
volved acts that took place in Korean territory, Korean authorities 
have made efforts to reach extraterritorial acts of companies by 
strengthening overseas detection through an enhanced intelli-
gence-gathering system launched in 2011.  As a result, prosecutors 
were able to initiate preliminary investigations into extraterritorial 
cases with the aid of Korean embassies abroad.  In order to make 
more use of the provision relating to the liability of a legal per-
son—in response to the OECD recommendations—Korean authori-
ties have further strengthened measures for the training of legal 
professionals.  The active participation of civil society groups, 
whose views were reflected in OECD recommendations, also 
served to increase pressure on the government to make reforms, 
along with informal capacity-building efforts of the ADB/OECD.  
 
4.  CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 
 
The assessments have shown that management can have dif-
                                                                                                          
Interview with Jak Jabes, Former Director of Governance at Asian Development 
Bank, Senior Fellow at University of Ottawa, in S.F., U.S. (Oct. 6, 2015) (explaining 
that although the OECD had proposed a peer review system, many Asian coun-
tries opposed it, and this initiative would not have passed in such a case). 
 180  See E-mail Interview with Gretta Fenner, Managing Director, Internation-
al Center for Asset Recovery, Basel Institute on Governance, Basel, Switz., partici-
pant in the development of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative as repre-
sentative from the OECD (Oct. 25, 2015) [hereinafter E-mail Interview] (describing 
that the procedure was built around peer review, peer discussion, and expert in-
put that mixed well with the Asian culture); see also ADB/OECD INITIATIVE FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 179, at 4.  
 181   E-mail Interview, supra note 180.  
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ferent impacts depending on the political, legal and economic situ-
ations of each country.  Based on the assessments made, this sec-
tion aims to examine some of the most relevant conditions for ef-
fective management, particularly those regulating transnational 
business activity.  
 
4.1.  Legal Structures for Enforcement 
 
Due to different legal traditions among states, certain legal con-
cepts under the Convention are more easily accepted and complied 
with by certain nations.  For example, the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention provides under Article 2 and 3 that states should es-
tablish liability of legal persons for foreign bribery, which may be 
imposed through either criminal, administrative or civil sanc-
tions.182  Yet, certain states still face challenges in recognizing cor-
porate liability for foreign bribery because the concept of liability 
of legal persons is still new to their legal traditions, or due to lack 
of legal structures and mechanisms to enforce it.  Countries such as 
the U.S., and other common law traditions such as the U.K. and 
Australia, have a long tradition of recognizing the concept of cor-
porate criminal responsibility,183 with a well-established culture of 
prosecuting corporations and the necessary structural mechanisms 
in place.  In such countries, the management process is likely to 
work effectively.  However, in countries dominated by other legal 
traditions, in which the concept is still relatively new or under-
utilized, it is not.  More specifically, a report from the OECD finds 
that states had very different starting points for establishing liabil-
                                               
 182  See Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 2-3 (requiring states to place criminal 
sanctions on corporations for foreign bribery, and in the event that a state does 
not recognize criminal liability of a legal person, the state party may impose non-
criminal sanctions that are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”).  
 183  See Susanne Beck, Mediating the Different Concepts of Corporate Criminal Li-
ability in England and Germany, 11 GERMAN L. J. 1093 (2010) (analyzing the gap be-
tween theoretical discourse and practical undertaking in the Anglo-American and 
German debates); see also Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through the Comparative Criminal Pro-
cedure, 118 YALE L. J. 126 (2008) (conducting a comparative analysis of the U.S. and 
German approach to corporate criminal liability); CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
LEGAL AND COLLECTIVE ENTITIES (Albin Eser et al. eds., 1999) (discussing another 
survey of the laws on corporate criminal responsibility in various countries); see 
generally CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK 
(Mark Pieth & Radha Ivory eds., 2011) (surveying the current practice of corporate 
criminal liability in fifteen civil and common law countries). 
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ity of legal persons, and certain countries had to begin “from 
scratch” because liability of legal persons was essentially a foreign 
concept.184  These countries need to undergo significant reform in 
their legal policies, retrain law enforcement officials, and make 
other structural amendments for management process regulations 
regarding legal person liability to be effective.  
Despite such challenges, the OECD has been able to influence 
all states parties to adopt liability of legal persons through the 
Working Group’s advice and peer pressure from the monitoring 
system.185  But since management can impact states differently de-
pending on their legal traditions and practices, particularly when 
new legal concepts are introduced to states, international institu-
tions need to promote more interaction between the different legal 
traditions in order to help the less experienced states incorporate 
these new legal concepts and improve relevant enforcement mech-
anisms.  Such efforts would facilitate a horizontal legal process, ra-
ther than a top-down approach in which international institutions 
educate states parties on how to establish new legal concepts.  
 
4.2.  Economic Capacity of States 
 
The findings in the quantitative assessment suggest that states 
with greater economic capacity are more likely to enforce and fol-
low up on recommendations provided by international institu-
tions.186  There are a few exceptions, as in the case of France, Italy 
and Spain where other political and legal factors, including a lack 
of legal reform, led to non-compliance.  Nonetheless, in general, 
the highest enforcement ratings have occurred in the most econom-
ically successful states, with lower average ratings for states with 
less powerful economies.  These findings affirm the Chayeses’ ar-
gument that capacity is one of the fundamental factors in effective 
compliance.  Yet, it further illustrates that there is still a capacity 
gap between developed and less developed states among the 
OECD countries and other parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Con-
                                               
 184  OECD, THE LIABILITY OF LEGAL PERSONS FOR FOREIGN BRIBERY: A 
STOCKTAKING REPORT 8 (2016), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Liability-
Legal-Persons-Foreign-Bribery-Stocktaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9CN-H82N].  
 185  Id.  
 186  Economic capacity refers to the State’s GDP ranking according to World 
Bank data.  See Figure 1, infra.   
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vention.  
Given the importance of mutual legal assistance and interna-
tional cooperation, more mechanisms must be put in place to re-
duce such a gap if the management process is to become more ef-
fective overall.  More specifically, sophisticated strategies and 
programs need to be established by the OECD and other institu-
tions to provide technical assistance to less-developed states on re-
gional and bilateral levels.  As an example, Korea has signed 
MOUs with Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Mongolia designed 
to build anti-corruption capacity and disseminate anti-corruption 
policies to these countries.187  States have also signed MOUs with 
the World Bank on mutual cooperation to prevent fraud and cor-
ruption.188  Other institutions could recommend similar arrange-
ments and help establish international and regional funds to sup-
port such technical assistance programs.  This would not only 
reduce the existing imbalance between various countries, but also 
facilitate international cooperation in the areas of detection and in-
vestigation.  
 
4.3.  Active Participation of Civil Society, Private Sector and the Media  
 
Full participation of civil society groups, the private sector and 
other independent experts is key to the management process.  In 
the area of anti-corruption, these groups make the process more ef-
fective in two aspects.  First, they increase transparency in the sys-
tem and enhance detection of foreign bribery.  The Chayeses, in 
particular, have stressed the role of nongovernmental organiza-
tions, which represent independent sources of information and 
thus can help to verify reports made by states.189  In the OECD 
monitoring process, participation of civil society, private sector 
representatives, and other independent experts is fundamental, as 
they are given formal status with opportunities to provide their 
own viewpoints on various issues, becoming a regulated mecha-
nism for control.  The OECD also designed its monitoring process 
                                               
 187  ACRC 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 140, at 17.  
 188  See KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 145, at 32 (“In February 2011, the 
SPO [Supreme Prosecutor's Office] also signed an MOU with the World Bank on 
mutual cooperation to prevent fraud and corruption to enable future cooperation 
and the referral of foreign bribery cases.”). 
 189  CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 251.  
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in a way that would secure the independence of such organizations 
to optimize their role.  As such, management processes should 
guarantee the independence of these non-state actors and allow for 
their full participation in the process.  
Moreover, the media can play a significant role in conjunction 
with efforts of international organizations to increase pressure on a 
state to comply with international norms.  In the case of the U.K., 
the OECD Chairman actively engaged with the media to publicize 
their concerns over the discontinuance of the investigations of the 
BAE systems case, as well as the delay in the legislation process of 
the U.K. Bribery Act.  As a result, there was active reporting and 
monitoring from the media, which increased awareness on the is-
sues among the public, pressuring the U.K. government to adopt a 
more comprehensive foreign bribery law.  Taking the advantages 
of media pressure and its repercussions on public opinion into ac-
count, the Working Group continues to publish press releases with 
each report.  
In sum, civil society groups, the private sector, and the general 
public as well as the media represent important sources in detect-
ing foreign bribery.190  In fact, the OECD reports that most allega-
tions come from private companies and it was found that nearly 
one-third of cases were self-reported.191  Moreover, domestic pros-
ecutors are increasingly relying on media allegations for investiga-
tions—this is the case of Korea, where some recent cases reached 
the pre-investigation stage.192  Even in the Tour de table of the 
OECD monitoring process, prosecutors from each state party re-
port on the status of cases that have appeared in the media, and 
this is continuously recorded and updated in the form of a ma-
trix.193  For all these reasons, to strengthen detection, the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery, along with other institutions, needs to 
make continuous efforts to generate more awareness on foreign 
bribery to not only civil society groups, but also to journalists, 
businesses, and the general public.  
                                               
 190 See OECD, THE DETECTION OF FOREIGN BRIBERY 67-68 (2017), 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/The-Detection-of-Foreign-
Bribery.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB77-FR4J] (explaining other cases involving de-
tection of foreign bribery through the media).  
 191  OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT, supra note 69, at 15-16.  
 192  See KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 145, at 10 (discussing how some 
cases involving extraterritorial conduct based on media allegations were in the 
pre-investigation stage and relied on Korean embassies). 
 193  THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 42.  
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4.4.  Networks of International and Regional Institutions  
 
The assessments illustrate that interaction and exchange of in-
formation among not only stakeholders, but also international and 
regional institutions, greatly benefits the management process.194  
The OECD has played a central role in the international anti-
corruption regime, networking with the U.N., ADB, APEC, and 
even the G20 in promoting initiatives.  Such expertise was not only 
useful to these institutions, but also helped harmonize standards 
among states.  The OECD also spurred regional anti-corruption ini-
tiatives such as the ADB/OECD,195 which have generated addi-
tional pressure on governments to adopt international norms.196  It 
is further working closely with the G20 on implementing interna-
tional legislative frameworks and strengthening international co-
operation.197  
Other examples illustrate that these networks among interna-
tional and regional institutions can also be used to pressure gov-
ernments and even detect foreign bribery.  In the case of the U.K., 
the OECD attempted to use mechanisms under the World Bank to 
increase due diligence over U.K. companies as a way to pressure 
the U.K. government to adopt the U.K. Bribery Act.  On the other 
hand, there have been cases in which international organizations 
referred certain cases to domestic law enforcement authorities.198  
In this regard, the management process should not be focused on a 
single institution, but utilize multiple coalitions and networks rep-
resenting various institutions, including high-level political fo-
rums, to maximize effectiveness.  
 
                                               
 194  See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2005) (argu-
ing that the regulatory systems we currently have in place can be effective in in-
vestigations and enforcement via a system of international networks and commu-
nications).  
 195  Id.  
 196  Telephone Interview with Akharakit Keeratithanachaiyos, Anti-
Corruption Specialist, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (Dec. 16, 2015).  
 197  OECD and the G20, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-
corruption/ [https://perma.cc/AQN3-QRV3] (last visited Apr. 5, 2018).  
 198  See THE DETECTION OF FOREIGN BRIBERY, supra note 190, at 143 (explaining 
how the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) referred a foreign bribery case to 
Belgian prosecutors). 
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4.5.  Use of Wide Extraterritorial Application of Domestic Foreign 
Bribery Laws  
 
Assessments have further demonstrated that widespread use of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction or broad extraterritorial application of 
states’ domestic laws has been particularly effective in inducing 
other states to strengthen their own laws on foreign bribery.  Broad 
coverage on the part of the FCPA is prompting states to enhance 
their investigation and prosecution capabilities.  It is a result of 
their interest to avoid sovereignty and reputational harm that may 
arise from investigations and prosecution by authorities abroad.199  
Scholars have found further evidence to support these findings.  
More specifically, it is found that the FCPA’s broad extraterritorial 
reach beyond the U.S. has spurred similar domestic action within 
Europe. 200  For example, Britain’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) did 
not investigate the BAE Systems case until the U.S. DOJ began its 
own case, at which point the U.K. media began to push for greater 
enforcement.201  Prosecution of Siemens by U.S. authorities under 
the FCPA also had the effect of strengthening Germany’s anti-
corruption laws, as Germany increased its number of prosecutions 
from a single case in 2005 to a total of 117 cases in 2009.202  There-
fore, encouraging states to widely interpret their extraterritorial 
laws can catalyze the management process to be even more effec-
                                               
 199  See Korean Construction Firms Operating Abroad Need to be Cautious of Brib-
ery, supra note 173 (arguing that Korean authorities need to take greater action 
against their own companies operating domestically and abroad, to ensure that 
they are not held liable under the U.S. FCPA).  
 200  See Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: 
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 
INT’L ORG. 745 (2011) (presenting strong statistical evidence linking extraterritori-
ality to national policy implementation, with jurisdictions that had experienced a 
U.S. intervention being twenty times more likely to enforce their national rules).  
 201  See US Inquiry Undermines British Stance on BAE, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 26, 
2007), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/26/bae 
[https://perma.cc/3GV2-Q33R] (“Liberal Democrat Vince Cable attacked the 
government, stating, ‘It is extraordinary and embarrassing that we have to rely on 
the higher standards of probity in the United States to investigate alleged corrup-
tion by a British Company in it is overseas business operations.’”). 
 202  Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman , supra note 200, at 755; Fritz 
Heimann & Gillian Dell, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Progress Report 2009: En-
forcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (Jun. 23, 2009), 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/enforcement_of_the_oec
d_convention_2009  [https://perma.cc/V7DE-MKP5].  
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tive.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
An empirical assessment of the management process of the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention demonstrates that management 
can steadily influence states to change their domestic laws and pol-
icies to better regulate transnational business activity for combat-
ting foreign bribery.  The findings for the quantitative assessment 
illustrate that states implemented recommendations at an average 
rate of 62% for Phase 2, and 56% for Phase 3, which both include 
the legislative and enforcement process.203  The qualitative assess-
ments of the United Kingdom and Republic of Korea similarly 
show how the management process under the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention influenced these states to make legislative changes and 
increase their enforcement capabilities for foreign bribery and cor-
ruption, which led to an increased number of prosecutions.  Yet, 
the assessments also illustrate that states’ compliance is generally 
lower when it comes to recommendations regarding liability of le-
gal persons, particularly for imposing effective sanctions on com-
panies.  States also continue to face challenges in prosecuting com-
panies for extraterritorial acts as was observed in the case of the 
Republic of Korea.  
In this regard, the management process under the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention may not go the full distance, but it is still in-
ducing states to make positive changes in their domestic legal poli-
cies by influencing states to become more vigilant of extraterritorial 
abuses, strengthen domestic capacity for investigation and prose-
cution, and facilitate coordination with other states.  More specifi-
cally, the findings of the assessment illustrate that states had either 
fully or partially implemented most of the recommendations on 
awareness-raising, capacity building for detection, reporting, in-
vestigations and prosecutions in both the legislative and enforce-
ment processes.204  A large percentage of recommendations regard-
ing the expansion of jurisdiction, mutual legal assistance and 
                                               
 203  See Figure 1, infra (showing the follow-up status ranking for each state, 
further dividing it based on Phase 2 and Phase 3). 
 204  See Figures 2 and 3, infra (describing various categories of recommenda-
tions and the total number of each during Phase 2). 
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investment of resources were also implemented.205  Moreover, 
states are beginning to strengthen capacity measures for overseas 
detection by training accounting and auditing professionals, tax 
and customs authorities, export credit support agencies, develop-
ment assistance agencies, public procurement officials and diplo-
matic missions.206  In addition, the establishment of independent 
anti-corruption agencies have contributed to inter-agency coordi-
nation, and provided further channels for the public to file com-
plaints.207  Based on the OECD recommendations, most countries 
have even adopted laws imposing obligations on public officials to 
report suspected foreign bribery to law enforcement authorities.208  
Many states have further adopted laws to strengthen whistleblow-
er protection.209   
Overall, the most significant achievement of the OECD is that it 
ensured all member states had effective legislation in place for lia-
bility of legal persons and expanded their jurisdictional scope to 
reach extraterritorial activities of companies.  All forty-three state 
parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention now recognize the 
liability of legal persons for foreign bribery.  The U.K. is a repre-
sentative case in which the OECD influenced the government to 
adopt a comprehensive legislation on foreign bribery with a provi-
sion on liability of legal persons.  The OECD Working Group also 
recommended all member states to expand their laws on nationali-
ty jurisdiction to legal persons, providing more room for states to 
reach extraterritorial activities of companies.  As such, there is evi-
dence that countries are beginning to make progress for investiga-
tion in foreign abuses.  For example, in Korea, the most recent 
OECD monitoring report found that the country has begun prelim-
inary investigations into the extraterritorial conduct of Korean 
companies.210  
Most importantly, all these efforts have, in effect, helped level 
the playing field for states and businesses through the harmoniza-
tion of domestic laws.  Particularly, introduction of new legal con-
cepts such as liability of legal persons for foreign bribery in differ-
                                               
 205  Id.  
 206  MID-TERM STUDY OF PHASE 2 REPORTS, supra note 56, at 131-32. 
 207  Id. at 133, 140-44. 
 208  Id. at 131, 137-39.  As a result, by 2006, nearly half of the parties required 
their public officials to report on suspected foreign bribery to law enforcement au-
thorities.  
 209  Id. at 142-44.  
 210  KOREA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 145, at 10. 
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ent countries, even in countries which had never recognized such a 
concept, has helped align global standards, providing reassurance 
to states that they are not at a competitive disadvantage, and there-
fore motivating states towards greater compliance.  As a result, 
more businesses have begun to adopt robust due diligence 
measures as a way of avoiding liability risks faced in global opera-
tions.  It has also helped ease administrative burdens and mitigate 
competitive risks for companies.  
These findings not only support the Chayeses’ managerial the-
ory, but further advance the theory by illustrating how manage-
ment can facilitate coordination through incorporation of new legal 
concepts and structures that shape domestic law.  The managerial 
theory has traditionally focused on norms as a way to motivate ini-
tial compliance, and transparency and capacity building as key el-
ements for inducing state compliance.  Nonetheless, the manage-
ment process under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
demonstrates how management can also induce compliance by 
harmonizing domestic laws through the introduction of new legal 
concepts such as liability of legal persons.  In this aspect, interna-
tional management has become more sophisticated, providing in-
stitutions with greater authority to participate directly in construct-
ing the legal and regulatory framework of states.211  More of these 
approaches to harmonize domestic laws through management 
should be utilized in other international regimes, particularly for 
regulating transnational business activity, based on continuous 
strategic interaction among international and regional institutions, 
states, businesses, the media, and civil society groups for effective 
state compliance.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
 211  See Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 321 (2011) (explaining how human rights norms are eschewing state dis-
cretion by instead dictating, with increasing specificity, the provisions to be 
adopted at the national and sub-national levels).   
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